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Abstract: This paper presents the main messages of a South American expert roundtable (ERT) on the
unintended side effects (unseens) of digital transformation. The input of the ERT comprised 39 propositions
from 20 experts representing 11 different perspectives. The two-day ERT discussed the main drivers and
challenges as well as vulnerabilities or unseens and provided suggestions for: (i) the mechanisms underlying
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major unseens; (ii) understanding possible ways in which rebound effects of digital transformation may
become the subject of overarching research in three main categories of impact: development factors,
society, and individuals; and (iii) a set of potential action domains for transdisciplinary follow-up processes,
including a case study in Brazil. A content analysis of the propositions and related mechanisms provided
insights in the genesis of unseens by identifying 15 interrelated causal mechanisms related to critical
issues/concerns. Additionally, a cluster analysis (CLA) was applied to structure the challenges and
critical developments in South America. The discussion elaborated the genesis, dynamics, and impacts
of (groups of) unseens such as the digital divide (that affects most countries that are not included in the
development of digital business, management, production, etc. tools) or the challenge of restructuring
small- and medium-sized enterprises (whose service is digitally substituted by digital devices). We identify
specific issues and effects (for most South American countries) such as lack of governmental structure,
challenging geographical structures (e.g., inclusion in high-performance transmission power), or the
digital readiness of (wide parts) of society. One scientific contribution of the paper is related to
the presented methodology that provides insights into the phenomena, the causal chains underlying
“wanted/positive” and “unwanted/negative” effects, and the processes and mechanisms of societal
changes caused by digitalization.
Keywords: digital transformation; unintended side effects; proposition-based expert roundtable;
trandisciplinarity
1. Introduction
1.1. Contextualizing Digital Transformation in Developing and Transitioning Countries
Digitization has been recognized as a main driver of human, socio-cultural evolution [1–3]. Digital
systems are changing society by increasing connectivity, converting processes and transforming information
from analog to digital. This enhances communication and interaction between people, organizations,
and things, and it augments perception on all scales from the nuclear-particle level to the level of the universe.
However, such change also includes a coarsening because we work with a finite set of representations that
may induce unexpected errors (e.g., error propagation of different types; see [4–6]). Although it is strongly
recognized that digitalization creates opportunities for enhancing social and environmental well-being,
it also raises the potential sustainability challenges [1] and unintended side effects (unseens) that extend
far beyond error propagation. Indeed, broad and pervasive digitalization processes present genuine
features of any fundamental technology innovation, with intended positive but also unintended negative
effects. Thus, based on the concept of triangulation, such processes should be analyzed based on different
perspectives trying to identifying where the rebounds are and to finding causal-effect relationships among
them. Such analysis should contribute to identify positive and negative unintended side effects, what we
call in this paper as unseens.
The present paper provides the key messages of a South American expert roundtable (ERT) on
structuring research on sustainable digital environments. This roundtable has been the third in a sequence
of regional science ERTs on this topic starting in Japan [7] and Europe [2], to be followed by the present
South American ERT and Indian, North American, and African ERTs in 2020/21. A basic idea is that
diverse world regions are differently prepared and equipped to maintain viability and/or leadership in the
current digital transition. As outlined in the carefully prepared workbook for the South American ERT [8],
this paper aspires to develop an overarching structure of unseens related to the digital transformation and
the world’s regions—here, for South America—and to provide ideas for transdisciplinary processes for
coping successfully with such a transformation.
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1.2. Adaptive Governance Capacity for Developing Socio-Technical Innovation
The idea of vulnerability management [9,10] relates prospective systemic risk management to a system’s
adaptive capacities to adapt if something negative (and unexpected) has occurred (such as with many
impacts of the digital transition). Thus, improving the adaptive governance capacity of sensitive stakeholder
groups and subsystems of a region for developing sociotechnical innovation is an acutely important means
of global, regional, and local sustainability management. The need for adaptive governance approaches,
multistakeholder discourses, and transdisciplinary discourses has also been discussed in the frame of
global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [11,12]. Different views of the best governance strategies
for developing digitized economies and managing digitization processes and consequences [1] include,
for instance: resisting preemptive regulation and promoting favorable conditions; central governments
taking an active role in shaping the direction and softening negative consequences of digitalization; and
a passive governing process in which government leaves industries to innovate while it builds capabilities
for addressing resulting social and environmental damage.
Taking a critical look at digitalization governance strategies, we may distinguish between [1]:
(i) a laissez-faire, industry-driven approach; an open-market-based approach that relies on a market’s
ability to organize and protect itself in the face of threats; and limited government intervention;
(ii) a precautionary and preemptive strategy on the part of a government to avoid or prevent exposure
to irreversible threat and mitigate risk in the immediate future; and
(iii) a stewardship and “active surveillance” approach by government agencies to reduce risks derived
from digitalization while promoting private-sector innovation.
We may take the European Union’s (EU) strategy as an example. In the course of privatization of
digital infrastructures [13], the EU had long followed a laissez-faire approach; yet, the EU is known
for high standards in the field of civil and human rights when ensuring privacy and safety and
empowering the economy (for instance when introducing the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR; see EU, 2018) or Article 17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which considers
personal data as personal property).
1.3. Goals of the South American ERT (Proposition-Based)
Digital technologies are transforming all domains of economic, sociopolitical, (bio-) technological,
environmental, and other systems and have provided groundbreaking beneficial innovations. Until now,
much research has focused on the development and implementation of digital technologies, yet little
attention has been given to reflecting on and anticipating the unseens of such technologies, although
they have the potential to endanger systems and structures that are considered valuable and that
contribute to the resilience of sociotechnological systems.
The goals of the South American and previous Japanese and European ERTs have been (1) to
identify positive or negative unseens linked to digital transitioning; (2) to reflect on the way(s) in
which unseens can best become subjects of science in an overarching way; and (3) to project, from the
science perspective, which unseens might become the subjects of transdisciplinary science, i.e., practice
discourse that relate different types of knowledge in order to efficaciously master complex, relevant
societal challenges [14].
2. Theory
2.1. Mechanisms on Unseens
The concept of unseens was developed in systems theory. Feedback loops are seen as general
patterns of living systems; they represent circular causalities. Feedback loops can cause instability,
chaotic behavior, bifurcation, and delayed, dislocated, and other unintended side effects. Coping
with unintended side effects is a major element of sustainability learning [15]. Argyris [16] applied
Forrester’s [17] loop feedback theory to double loop learning. One loop, the primary feedback loop,
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includes the primary objectives related to an activity, however any action has unintended side effects,
such as a bee’s energy consumption when it seeks nectar. This is called the secondary feedback loop.
Nuclear waste and accident management, for example, may be seen as unseens, rebounds, or boomerang
effects stemming from the production of nuclear energy. Yet there are also positive side effects, e.g.,
the use of DNA information for criminal analysis may be considered a positive side effect.
The digital transition has led to a wide range of unseens. The Japanese ERT [7] discussed concerns
ranging from the loss of privacy, shifting realities, and Western cultural imperialism via new relationships
with machines (falling in love with computers/robots) to cyberterrorism, digital oligarchy, and a digital
economic divide. When we talk about mechanisms’ unseens, two factors are important. First, what is
unintended and what constitutes negative or positive impacts depend on a specific perspective given
by an analysist, organization, country, or other human system or stakeholder. This is related to the
issue of sustainability including a normative component that is assigned according to the values, norms,
objectives, etc. of the stakeholders involved. This, in turn, is related to the stance that the mechanisms
underlying the digital transition are based on drivers of human actors when using and developing digital
technologies and of properties of social systems such as market mechanisms.
For instance, human beings aspire to improve the economy, seeking to pay the lowest price
possible, which is, at best, no cost at all. Thereby, internet users are willing to provide personal data to
digital search engines providers such as Google or to social media such as Facebook. These global
companies are driven to survive in the market or to gain leadership worldwide, and one smart business
option is to market its users’ personal data to business, political, or other actors. This, in turn, may
result in loss of privacy, which—at least in Western cultural settings—is considered an unintended
side effect. As the present paper takes a sustainability perspective, unintended negative side effects of
South American stakeholder groups are in the foreground of analysis, although what is positive for
one stakeholder group may be negative for another.
An increasing set of scientific inquiries are analyzing, describing, and explaining mechanisms that
are causing unseens [18,19]. We present several of these to provide a scaffold for relating the propositions
of the South American ERT to general trends and mechanisms.
The main message of the European ERT [2] was that the option to generate, transfer, store, process
(compute), retrieve, and use digital data seemingly ubiquitously is fundamentally changing the world’s
economic system. The smart use of digital data, D, is supplementing the classical economic key variable
labor, L, capital, C, and natural resources, R. Thus, the genesis of economy or gross domestic products,
GDP, has changed from
GDP = f (C, L, R) → GDP = f (C, L, R, D)
This may have immense impacts if countries, companies, or other human systems are not owners
of digital technology resources. As they are (widely) immaterial and can be transferred at low cost to
centers for storage, these systems cannot participate in the value chain, as, for instance, the profits
made by the use of tools and services of automatization [20] are made abroad. This results in increasing
the digital divide for developing countries in a critical manner.
Whereas the Industrial Revolution substituted machine energy for human (and biotic) energy,
the digital transition allows for replacing human cognitive operations with those accomplished by
computers. From a phylogenetic perspective, this is even more fundamental than the change of the
economic system. A proposition of the Japanese ERT is that we may have to redefine humanity. If we
reflect on evolutionary drivers, we may postulate about evolutionary competition (such as the current
economic power game), about curiosity, or about convenience. With respect to the last, Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) promoted the development of the digital {0, 1} number system and
constructed one of the first mechanical computers because he was bored by the tedious calculations
needed for his modeling and theory building [21]. Thus, we may argue that convenience and the
outsourcing of labor may be seen as drivers, but in addition, military and political power have become
digitized, as evidenced by China’s surveillance society [19].
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Global networking has become an essential property of and vision of the digital world since
Berners-Lee’s 1989 World Wide Web (WWW) (www, [22]) project. We are facing a kind of global
brain or nervousnet-like supersystem that may be conceived as “the self-organizing, adaptive network
formed by all people on this planet together with the information and communication technologies that
connect them into a cohesive system” [23]. However, this vision has nearly become a nightmare. Data is
being used for social surveillance. The integrity of web based media is discussed, including the misuse
of fake news. Under the term “cyber sovereignty,” Russia, China, and several other states such as Egypt
have stepped out of the global network. Examples such as the global discussion on internet standards
for the Internet of Things [24] demonstrate that digitalization, also from a technology perspective,
means more than having access to cell-phone signals. The digital transition is complex and includes
disruptive effects and power games on many levels, which makes South America, as a subcontinent
of the Americas, vulnerable with respect to the digital transition. Identifying and ordering these
vulnerabilities and unseens is the main objective of this paper.
2.2. Impacts of Digital Transformation and Innovations in Economy and Society
To gain a more in-depth understanding of the impacts of digital transformation and innovations in
the economy and society, in the following, we illustrate with some examples. The global deployment
of networked cameras, sensors and other digital artifacts produce an impressive amount of data.
Such volumes of data combined with algorithms applying artificial intelligence (AI) enable automated
systems to perform diverse complex tasks, historically performed by human beings. For example, cameras
and sensors can replace security personnel; autonomous vehicles can reduce the need of human-operated
vehicles, meaning the disappearance of taxi-drivers; robots can replace warehouse workers; automated
algorithms applied for government-decision making processes can reduce the number of civil servants.
As another example, formerly genuine human services such as language translation, legal advice, and first
health services will be replaced by appropriate and efficient digital services entirely conducted through
the use of computers. In a digitalized future society characterized by increased productivity it is expected
that workers’ labor will be more valuable and the goods produced relatively less costly. In addition,
in such digitalized contexts, also observed is mass amateurization. For example, journalists are replaced
by bloggers and influencers [25]. Observing such changes, at a first glance, there are two linked major
rebound effects. The first is the loss of workplaces mainly in routine, activity-based jobs [26] that comprise
a larger share of employment in developing countries than in developed countries. The second linked
major rebound effect is that buying more with less money will increase material consumption, with
resulting severe negative impacts on climate change from deforestation, loss of biodiversity, mineral
resources management, and greater waste (recyclable and non-recyclable production), among other
non-environmental friendly effects [27,28].
We do not know how rapidly current business models will be reshaped and/or jobs replaced, when
major changes will occur, and when consequential opportunities will arise [3]. Yet, a critical question
reads: Will the unavoidable loss of considerable numbers of well-established jobs be outweighed by
newly created jobs? Desirable societal effects of smart digitization involve the growth of employment
(IT industries, new IT-based business opportunities) and increased productivity (workers’ labor being
more valuable) [3].
Optimistic digital futurists go further, citing Herbert Simon’s 1965 statement: “Machines will be
capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do” [29]. The optimists postulate artificial
intelligence-based human substitution in activities that require high levels of cognitive skills and an
increasing share of the work of high-level decision-makers being accomplished by machine-supported
decision-making. Therefore, digitization processes may hit knowledge-based business models and
cognitive workers as hard as—or even faster—than non-knowledge business models and manual
workers. New work opportunities, whether employment or freelance, will undoubtedly emerge,
and even if digitization results in a net loss of jobs, welfare will not necessarily be negatively affected by
the change as it may be linked to the old [30]—and new—discussion of unconditional basic income [31].
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Theoretical reflections on digitalization, partly from a South American perspective, have shown that
fundamental functions of society such as labor, citizenship, basic components of economy, education,
and also governance are transformed by digital technologies. From a developing and transitioning
country perspective, education may pave the avenue to better development, but we may also argue
that agile management calls for solid, reliable governmental framings as fundamental transitions of
social systems take decades. As the big five of digital industry—namely, Alphabet Inc., Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Microsoft, and Alibaba have much control over how the Internet works in different
countries, nation states have limited control over the Internet. The big five are more than global business
players. They must be considered as global infrastructure providers. Thus, the providers of basic and
universal infrastructure cannot be compared to enterprises such as Coca-Cola or Mercedes. Their impacts,
global reach, capacity to provide portfolios of universal information technology services, their possession
of explicit and implicit knowledge, and influence empower them to impact in what way a country may
participate in the internet-cloud-based generation of value. Whether and how this may develop cannot be
forecast or predicted. This holds true particularly for information and communication technologies (ICT)
for development [32]. Sahay et al. [32] refer to complexity, uncertainty, and new challenges such as the
above-mentioned fundamental changes as research challenges. However, as scientists, decision-makers,
and the public at large participate in the venture, for instance, in transdisciplinary learning processes,
we may think about the ways in which sustainable projects may help strengthen developing countries.
2.3. Science–Practice Collaboration and the Vision of a Transdisciplinary Process Following the Legal Aspects of
How a Particular Solution will be Adopted and How Users will Benefit from It
Designing solutions for the type of multidimensional and multifaceted problems that communities
face today requires the collaborative efforts of scientists from multiple disciplines working in close
collaboration with practitioners and policy makers who understand the problem details and possess
primary data. In particular, the need for science–practice collaboration is underpinned by the following
arguments. Practitioners encounter, are able to recognize, and have experience with real world problems.
Scientists know theories, methodologies, and tools for designing solutions, which can later be tested
and refined in authentic settings by practitioners. This is expressed in Figure 1. Transdisciplinary
processes organize societal learning processes to develop socially robust orientations for sustainable
development [14]. Socially robust means that the orientation includes scientific state-of-the-art knowledge
(represented by the upper lens in Figure 1), the results from integrating and relating science knowledge
(i.e., academic rigor) and best knowledge from science (i.e., experiential wisdom), whereby not only the
uncertainty but also the ignorance of human knowledge are acknowledged, and that the constraints of the
study become transparent [15]. As sustainable transitions include normative issues, the multistakeholder
discourse (bottom lens in Figure 1) should include representatives from all major stakeholder groups
involved in the transdisciplinary process. We present the core of transdisciplinarity, and propose that the
ERT should initiate a transdisciplinary process based on one of the most pressing challenges identified
by it.
Particularly in South America, universities deliver skillful professionals and researchers to
societies. However, compared with the developed world, countries in the region lack: (a) the ability to
generate data and process it efficiently, (b) the capacity for translating research results into development
instruments, (c) the capacity for knowledge transfer and exchange and brokerage platforms to
facilitate them, and (d) incentive instruments and mechanisms for promoting research—practice
collaboration. In addition to addressing the previously mentioned gaps, science–practice collaboration
could contribute finding new ways to generate, utilize, transfer, and integrate knowledge, aiming at
fulfilling the development goals of our communities.
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The method proposition-based ERT can be viewed as (i) a means to draw attention and to
prepare s ientists for participating in the targeted transdisciplinary process (see Figure 1) and (ii) as
a problem-structu ing tool. The idea of problem structuring was d veloped in soft operational dec s on
research [34–37] nd was applied and adjusted for transdisci linary processe [38,39]. The proposition-based
ERT was developed in the course of the 2017 Japanese ERT [7] and th 2018 European ERT [2]. We could
le rn from the Jap n se ERT that scie tists focusing on un ee s of the digital transiti n may be viewed as
a kind of triangulati . The analysis of the propositions allowed for getting compatible views on types of
risks, threats relate to global AI applicatio s, and specifics of the Asian-Japanese culture. The European
ERT went one step further. It i itiat d a transdisciplinary process based o th key message. This messages
states that major unseens from the digital revolution result from insufficiently understood relations between
owne ship, economic v lue, access, a d use of digital data. Based on this messag , the large-scale project
“The R sponsible Use of Digital Data as the Subj ct of a Transdisciplinarity Process” (DiDaT; [40]) was
initiated in 2018 in the exact way it has be n described in Section 3.1 [40].
3. Methodology
3.1. The Methodology of Proposition-Based Expert Roundtables
A team of scientists from Danube University (Scholz, Parycek, and Viale Pereira) contacted
researchers working in the sustainability and digitalization fields (Ferraresi [co-organizer], Estevez,
Luciano) at South American universities for co-hosting the ERT. The perspectives (see Table 1) were
first identified by the organizers (Ferraresi, Scholz, Viale Pereira, Collazzo, and Damião) and adjusted
through a phone chain. The perspectives are a kind of triangulation of systemic prospects/layers of the
digital transition. Finally, 20 scientists representing five South American countries (see Table 1) provided
39 propositions on relevant unseens of the digitalization in South America (see Appendix A) related to
11 p rspectives. Intensive preprocessing (with multiple revisions) took place in the construction of the
proposals, due mostly to the new perspective of not focusing on the positive (intended) prospects but
rather on the impacts of secondary fe back loops. B sed on this process, a “Workbook for Preparing
the South American Roundtable Structuring Research on Sustainable Digital Environments” was
prepared, including the propositions of Appendix A. All participants received the workbook a week
before the ERT was to convene.
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Table 1. Perspectives and science experts (all experts whose names are followed by a + participated in
the ERT 1 and the proposal; experts with a * only provided propositions).
No. Perspective Experts (Country)
1 Digital Infrastructure E. Estevez + (AR)
2 Artificial Intelligence C. Chesñevar + (AR)
3 The Dark Side of ICT L. A. Joia + (BR)
4 Rebounds of Smart Cities M. A. Cunha + (BR) & J. P. Albuquerque (BR)
5 Economic Change A. A. Ferraresi + (BR) & C. Quandt + (BR)
6 Industrial Change P. Collazzo-Yelpo + (UR)
7 Big Data in Occupational Health F. M. Fischer + (BR) & J. S. Silva-Junior * (BR)
8 Digital Democracy D. Cardona + (CO) & A. Sanchez + (CH)
9 Cybercrime D. R. S. Rios + (BR) & F. C. O. Garcia * (BR)
10 Corruption E. M. Luciano + (BR)
11 Banking & Cryptocurrency E. H. Diniz * (BR)
1 The ERT was moderated by R. W. Scholz (AT) and G. Viale Pereira (AT/BR). + Experts who participated in the
ERT and provided propositions. * Experts who only provided propositions. Country References: AR—Argentina,
BR—Brazil, UR—Uruguay, CO—Colombia, CH—Chile, AT—Austria.
To clarify the main concepts of the first two perspectives, we introduce the following two definitions.
Digital infrastructure refers to foundational services—like fixed broadband Internet, mobile broadband
Internet, Internet coverage and others—constituting the information technology capabilities of a country,
region, or city enabling citizens and businesses to benefit from access to information. Artificial intelligence
is defined as the automation of activities associated with human thinking, which include decision-making,
problem solving, and learning [41].
The idea for proposition-based ERTs is that the science experts provide three to five basic
propositions related to the three key questions described above (Section 1.3), with a maximum of
300 words and a maximum of 10 key references for understanding the scientific roots. All participants
were asked to thoroughly work through all of the propositions prior to the ERT, to think about how
their own propositions are related to the others, and to focus on specific and generic mechanisms
generating the unseens involved in the proposition.
The two-day ERT took place in Curitiba, Brazil, on 9–10 August 2018. Participants included 12 of
the authors of the propositions and the first and last authors of this paper as moderators. After a brief
(five-min maximum) presentation of the background, the key, and potentially hidden general messages,
each set of proposals (accessible to participants in the workbook) was discussed for 30–40 min to
develop a deeper understanding of a specific perspective message. The experts had been informed of
the highlights of the Japanese and European ERTs by mail before the ERT in Curitiba. The main steps
of this proposition-based ERT is presented in Figure 2.
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was applied in an exploratory manner, we used the Ward Algorithm as it usually provides the most
distinct separation of clusters.
Third, a set of eight potential action domains for transdisciplinary follow-up processes (see Section 3.1)
were identified by carefully looking at communalities of the main concerns from a policy perspective.
4. Results
4.1. Drivers and Challenges/Barriers Identified in the Proposals of South American Experts
This section describes the identified (see 1 of the right box in Figure 2) positive drivers and
challenges of digitalization in the different perspectives taken (Table 1) considering both the specificities
of Latin American countries (compared to other regions of the world) and the characteristics of
developing and emerging economies.
The concept of digital infrastructure (addressed by E. Estevez; all names refer to Table 1) was
analyzed considering three main dimensions: ICT deployment (policy context infrastructure and
connectivity), government capacity, and digital literacy (human skills) (P1; P1–P39 refer to the
propositions in the Appendix A). In general, digital infrastructure has the potential to “enable access
and information sharing, collaboratively creating new knowledge and delivering personalized services”
(P2). However, there is an exceptionally low population density in most parts of South America, which
makes the market unattractive for ICT companies, increasing the challenge of broadband coverage
and costs. Another identified barrier is the late response from governments as regulators, resulting in
a scenario of oligopolistic digital power (P3).
Disruptive technologies have a potential for significantly changing the way governments and
companies are delivering services and products to end users. The successful deployment of disruptive
technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) (C. Chesñevar), big data, and the Internet of Things (IoT)
requires a systematic analysis of the overall system landscape, which demands a systematic and holistic
approach. Concerning AI applications, new business models have emerged as well as paradigms that
allow for compliance with users’ needs such as the “ubiquity of Agreement Technologies (AT) that
covers autonomy, interaction, mobility, and openness” (P4) as a way to mitigate the challenges related
to lack of transparency and awareness of the final users. AI-based tools and related recommendation
capabilities have the potential to “simplify users’ choices” (P5) in a scenario of growing information and
new possibilities of the digital world. This aspect is challenged by the dynamics of users’ preferences,
lack of trust, the potential for manipulation, and provenance, which influence the reputation of
the recommendations. In this sense, the use of IoT as sensors and as a source for decision-making
has different consequences. It can be considered positive when used for “building digital public
opinion about ‘everything’” or negative when referred to “monitoring urban behavior” (P6). Therefore,
redefining ethical issues and social contracts is among the greatest challenges for the use of AI, especially
in the public sector.
The dark side of ICT (L. A. Joia) perspective addressed three main aspects of the digital
transformation: the impact of ICT in developing countries, the phenomenon of social media and
popular movements, and the effects of smartphone use on mental health. Regarding the first aspect,
the “ICT potential for development of developing countries” (P7) and the challenge of overcoming
the significant gap in access opportunities between Latin American countries and EU countries was
emphasized. This argument aligns with that of Walsham [43], who questioned the real impact of ICTs
for development and how to extend their benefits and mitigate the so-called side effects, for instance,
of the rich/poor and global divide. The second point addresses social media and popular movements
as drivers for “listening to ‘unheard’ voices in the society” and promoting “new forms of collaboration
and interaction” (P8). However, the promised freedom of smartphones can easily be transformed as
a form of “slavery” (P9) as a consequence of self-reinforced social dependence of the individual citizen
on smartphone news [44].
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When bringing digital environments to the city level, smart cities (M. A. Cunha and J. P. Albuquerque)
emerge as a way to address the growing phenomenon of urban areas and the consequent problems
that emerge from this expansion. In a context of complexity and connectivity of the society, smart
cities require the deployment of multiple information systems and applications in a comprehensive,
innovative, and integrated way, which relates to the digital infrastructure perspective. The main barrier
includes the technological lock-in on a citywide scale as a consequence of the “disparities of competences”
and “maintenance costs of the technological infrastructure” (P10). There is a potential for smart cities
to foster digital participation and citizen empowerment by “engaging citizens in the process of data
production” and “establishing appropriate modes of engagement between citizens, government and
digital technologies” (P11). This possibility comes with structural barriers related to the lack of conditions
for critically engaging with digital technology by large parts of the poor and marginalized population,
which may limit effective participation to wealthy and homogeneous societal groups, while large parts
of the population may have their roles constrained to act as simple sensorial devices that capture (mostly
predefined) data, implying the instrumentality of digital participation (P12).
The economic change (A. A. Ferraresi and C. Quandt) perspective brings the discussion to the
impacts of the global trend in automation that, on one hand, is seen as a driver for economic growth
but, on the other, has consequences such as the “growing unemployment rate of low-qualified human
resources and difficulties adapting to changes produced by a digital world” (P13). The fact that knowledge
is a strategic resource for enhancing prospects for productivity growth increases the digitalization labor
divide because of the “high negative impact in regional productivity and profitability of less-developed
regions unable to follow the trends” (P14). Digital property rights also bring a challenge to the
appropriation of digital resources, such as data, and their economic value in the digital world, especially
in defining ownership of intangible/dematerialized resources (P15). In the context of the labor force,
there is, on one hand, the universal access to information as a driver and, on the other, the lack of
digital readiness due to a delay in restructuring educational programs and professional education in
the region to provide effective qualifications for responding to the digital transition and dealing with
transdisciplinary capabilities (P16). The analytics provided by technology leave part of the society behind,
affecting certain segments/strata of society that will not find employment. Digitally disrupted economies
emerge as an opportunity for new business models and wealth creation and, at the same time, represent
a disruption of traditional manufacturing and services (P17), which—without the correct regulatory
frameworks—results in a scenario of oligopolistic digital power (P3). Finally, digital transformation
also affects specific sectors, such as digital or smart agriculture, having as drivers new opportunities
for increased rural productivity due to new technologies and, as its main challenge, the transformation
of the role of local farmers in the supply chain dealing with genetic diversity and the sustainability of
small farms.
Industry 4.0 (P. Collazzo-Yelpo) is changing the decision-making capabilities in firms, allowing for
a more accurate, responsive, and flexible process due to real-time access to data and the faster spread of
information (P20). The challenge of building these capabilities is fundamental to avoid the consequent
Industry 4.0 divide among small and large companies and among countries globally distributed.
On the perspective of big data in occupational health (F. M. Fischer et al.), three main aspects
were discussed: disclosure of work-related diseases and work injuries (P22), digital data analytics
and early functional aging (P23), and the payment of social security benefits and public policies
(P24). The disclosure of data in occupational health has the potential to raise “awareness about
safety and health at work and provide data for evidence-based policy making, which supports the
design of improved health-promotion programs and prevention of work-related diseases/injuries”
(P22). The drivers of digital data analytics include the “prevention of excluding workers associated
with early functional aging and the possibility to keep experienced workers active” (P23). The main
barrier relates to the quality and accuracy of data as a consequence of open access, which is due
to the underreporting of events and bias when reporting work-related illnesses (P22, P23). This is
particularly true in relation to professions with a high risk for accidents, which may receive biased
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data. There is also an ethical dilemma on the social justice dimension in regard to the balance of public
accounts of national social security systems, which require transparency on the use of public funds for
paying social security benefits and citizens’ awareness about possible deficits (P24). This discussion is
extended to the private sector (for instance, with the emergence of DNA analytics) and the use of open
data related to health and safety at work for higher health insurance rates.
Digital infrastructure, in particular connectivity, is among the drivers for promoting digital
democracy (D. Cardona and A. Sanchez). Appropriate connectivity contributes, on one hand, to the
increased visibility of public matters, trust in public administration, and improving the control of public
administration and, on the other hand, facilitates access to information and interaction with citizens
(P25). However, the challenge is to provide connectivity with the most appropriate technologies,
instead of incurring the costs of expensive (the latest) solutions (P25). The digital revolution has
the potential to redefine democracy with increased possibilities of “mobilizing people for societal
changes and increasing community awareness about world issues” (P26). However, digital media are
challenging the existing sociotechnical configurations and cultural contexts that may affect the truth
and the trust in societies to deal with populism, political polarization, far-right or far-left extremism,
radicalization, waves of hate against women and minorities, post-truth, and fake democracy [45]. At the
same time that social media have become critical to promote social attention and engagement, facilitate
information sharing, coordinate social movements’ activities, and exchange emotional information,
they have generated a “new form of civic activism that may jeopardize traditional structures and the
whole social system” (P27). The pervasive effect of the potential reduction of information asymmetry
has also become a challenge as a source of distortion on the equilibrium of many systems, including
the structure of society at all levels (P28). Finally, when discussing this aspect from a public sector
perspective, digitalization was seen as promising for democratizing the benefits of the digital society,
but it has become a challenge to fulfill the high investments of electronic government initiatives (P29).
The roundtable also included context-specific perspectives such as cybercrime, corruption, and
cryptocurrency. In the context of cybercrime (R. S. Rios and F. C. O. Garcia), the digital world has been
challenging existing institutions with new forms of criminality (P32) that extend beyond the borders of
a nation and its jurisdiction. The challenges include the transnational nature of cybercrime (P31) and
the fact that existing laws cannot always predict every possible aspect of a crime (P30). There is a lack
of specific knowledge, for instance, on dealing with multi and interconnected offenses that have to be
merged (P32).
The perception of corruption (E. M. Luciano) approached the topic in relation to the level of
administrative burden in countries, which, in Latin America especially, is considered very high [45].
Sometimes, efforts to reduce administrative burden are too heavily focused on technologies [46]
instead of on organizational processes. Decision-making focused on technology more than on its
suitability for the organizational processes can increase the presence of segregated and stand-alone
solutions in governmental agencies (P33). In countries with high levels of state bureaucracy, laws,
rules, and procedures are numerous and sometimes disconnected or overlapping, thereby increasing
the occurrence of over- or under-regulated situations [46]. In this context, there is a risk of making
changes without the necessary discussion and without considering all the inherent complexity and
focused only on giving fast answers to the pressures of civil society. This situation can lead to
under-regulated situations, which can, paradoxically, increase corruption (P34). It is necessary to
develop a state’s capacity for decision-making and governance focusing on long-term planning decisions.
Among the challenges is to define adequate anti-corruption practices considering context-specific
social-cultural-behavioral aspects (P35). Another aspect is that corruption has been redefined by digital
transformation, and although digitalization increases the digital trail, new forms of corruption have
emerged in the digital world (P36).
The perception of banking and cryptocurrency (E. H. Diniz) has an important role in explaining
the field of digital payments and understanding the evolution of complementary currencies. One
particular driver of the adoption of complementary cryptocurrencies is to develop the local economy at
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the time of financial crisis, with the emergence of “neighborhood currencies” or “social currencies” (P37).
The adoption of cryptocurrencies creates a new mechanism for rewarding users for their loyalty. However,
the implementation of blockchain technology and the use of fidelization strategies for positive citizen
engagement are considered major challenges (P38). Finally, the perspective addresses the challenge of
expanding the use of cryptocurrencies and ensuring their stability (P39).
4.2. Unseens Discussed in the South American ERT and Main Groups of Causalities Resulting in Unintended
and Unwanted Unseens
This section presents the unseens or the vulnerabilities identified as part of the 39 propositions
contributed by experts that were further enriched through the discussions maintained during the ERT
conducted in Curitiba (originating 15 Major Concerns). According to their nature and based mainly
on their impacts, we classify them into three main categories (of impacts on): context factors (CF),
individuals (IN) and society (SO). The list of unseens, the references to the proposition in which they
were identified, and the category in which they were classified are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. List of Identified Unseens.
Unseen Prop Type
Low population density P1 CF
Low capacity and weak government institutions P1 CF
Psychological warfare P2 IN
Digital curtain imposed by internet giants P3 CF
Users’ perception/acceptance P4 IN
Need for improved recommendation and explanation capabilities P5 IN
Use of “black-box” algorithms P5 IN
Digital image versus information flow among cities’ ecosystems P6 SO
ICT development reinforcing socioeconomic gaps P7 SO
Crises of representation P8 CF
Homo digitalis P9 IN
Delusion of democratization P12 SO
Weakening government institutions P12 SO
Governments in the region lack the ability to adapt P13 CF
Increasing inequalities P14 SO
Dematerialization of wealth production P15 CF
Lack of adaptation of educational systems P16 SO
Creating and strengthening monopolies/oligopolies P17 CF
Further inequalities in the labor market P17 SO
Small farmers becoming powerless P18 SO
Genetic manipulation of farm products P18 SO
Bias in reporting data about work-related diseases/injuries P22 CF
Fewer opportunities for young workers P23 SO
Social exclusion as a consequence of the rigors of health assessments P24 SO
Misuse of information due to intentionally poor data quality P24 CF
Misuse of public funds P25 CF
Manipulating citizens’ opinions in social media P26 CF
Manipulating protests P27 CF
Jeopardizing traditional institutions P27 CF
Ubiquity of users of digital platforms may exhibit a lack of understanding of local community needs P27 CF
Raising awareness about socio-economic gaps between countries distorts the equilibrium of many
systems P28 CF
Increasing inequalities P29 SO
Identifying the offender and place of operation; which jurisprudence? P30 CF
Lack of admissibility of evidence in court P31 CF
Underestimated growth of complementary cryptocurrencies P36 CF
Crypto-engagement of customers as new mechanisms for citizen engagement P37 CF
The potential of stable cryptocurrency P38 CF
Based on a preliminary analysis of the 39 propositions on 11 perspectives, the two-day ERT in
Curitiba on August 9 and 10, 2018, and continuous interactions between the experts, the first and
second authors composed 15 unseens or critical phenomena caused by the digital transition in South
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America (Box 1). This was done when referring to the 76 single causalities, labeled major concerns
(MCs). For each MC, a qualitative description of factors and causalities is provided.
Box 1. Major concerns, highlights, messages, hot spots, and lessons of the SA ERT on Sustainable
Digital Environments.
(MC1) Global digital divide—The region is characterized by challenging terrain including mountainous
areas, jungles, and a vast territory, presenting severe disadvantages for ICT deployment. Thus, new market
mechanisms need to be envisioned to generate opportunities for attracting private sector investments. It is
expected that such investments should be able to overcome the current high costs of deploying new digital
infrastructure in the region, to counterbalance the high costs of ICT resources compared with other regions of the
world, and to bridge the gap that this region and its countries face compared to developed countries in terms
of connectivity, e.g., international internet bandwidth per user. The current conditions represent barriers for
development since lack of access to information precludes workers from equipping themselves with capacities
they need to improve their opportunities for employment and to exercise their right to be aware of work-related
diseases and injuries, among other negative consequences.
(MC2) Identifying vulnerable groups—The region and each country in it have different types of vulnerable
groups, each presenting specific needs. Governments should first know who they are; second, understand
each group’s particular needs; and third, design programs to promote their social and economic inclusion,
contribute to developing their capacities, and ensure that they are neither discriminated against nor manipulated
by outsiders.
(MC3) Lack of government capacity—Current scenarios are delivering complex new challenges for
governments. For example, they are pressed to define new regulations governing how we interact in the
digital world; they face a continually changing environment pushed by internet giants; they are urged to make
decisions based on advice from technology oligopolies, while at the same time, they need to build trust in
weakened traditional government institutions. A common feature in the region is the lack of government
capacity in various areas, including a lack of qualified human resources and in-house know-how, scarce financial
resources, hierarchical organizational structures that resist change, and rigid and complex regulatory and legal
frameworks. New governance models, including acquiring capacity by partnering with external stakeholders,
can help strengthen their capacities.
(MC4) Digital Literacy/Inequality—There is a lack of proper conceptualization and understanding of what
digital literacy means, particularly considering the local context and its different communities. Governments
need to identify and understand the readiness of their communities. They need to analyze the underlying causes
of digital inequality and properly assess the differences between poor/underprivileged and rich/educated groups
and define policies and programs designed to bridge the gaps.
(MC5) Social media has the power to jeopardize democracy—Social media and its massive use by society
contribute to amplify messages among people who have similar ideas, therefore, contribute to social polarization.
Citizens´ opinions appearing on the internet are not under the control of any responsible institution that could
be liable for the published information. Citizens do not have the capacity to assess what digital information
is meaningful and reliable. Moreover, many times, their trust is abused by fake news. The digital literacy of
citizens, and particularly those competencies needed to identify fake news, activists, or trolls, is too low for
participating in reliable democratic processes and dialogues online.
(MC6) Data as the new currency—At a time when big data is available for almost every sector and both
private and public sectors are benefiting from their exploitation, the value of data is of utmost relevance. On one
hand, citizens are relinquishing personal data to big IT companies or simply publishing their private data on the
open domain. Mostly, they are unaware of the consequences of making their data available online and how others
might use it for their own advantage and profit. On the other hand, new mechanisms for sharing and accessing
data are providing opportunities for new business models in different sectors, e.g., health, tourism, trade, and
culture, among others. Such models are associated with benefits for some actors but also with damages or losses
for others. There is a critical need to assess and openly account for who benefits and is empowered by the use of
open data and personal data shared on the internet and how this data contributes to new development models.
(MC7) Trust in unknown virtual sources of information—The source of ICT/Google-based information
is evolving rapidly and in unpredictable ways. There is experimental evidence (see Montag and Diefenbach,
Towards Homo digitalis (Ref. 1)) that people tend to unknowingly believe in seemingly personal, independent,
algorithmic recommendations more than in someone’s personal recommendation. Thus, the unseen of
missing/delayed adaptation may induce harm. There is an increasing amount of information and speed of
information flow (partly in a self-organizing process) on social media. Reinforcing algorithms in the digital
curtain/social media is preventing the access of diverse information, and unaware citizens are consuming
information depicting only part of—but definitely not all—dimensions of the real world.
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(MC8) Rebounds of smart cities and spatial transfer—Pushed by current trends, important cities in the region
are investing significant resources in developing smart-city initiatives. In many cases, the initiatives raise ethical
dilemmas between functional management aspects of smart cities and stakeholder demands, like the risk of
gentrification. Several Latin American cities have a configuration of a central region, sometimes including
the municipality, a commercial area, and wealthy neighborhoods, surrounded by pockets of poverty and
vulnerability. Besides “pushing” people to peripheral regions, smart-city initiatives may also be pushing
problems into marginalized regions and creating unseen challenges for the most vulnerable communities.
(MC9) Digital readiness—Countries in the region face the challenge of not having a critical mass of human
resources equipped with the digital competencies required to adapt and succeed in new economic models,
like the industrial revolution 4.0 and knowledge societies. There is a retrospective reaction and a prospective
dimension with respect to this mechanism/causal chain. The retrospective reaction refers to the management of
the current situation and the need to develop mechanisms and incentives for educating and retraining people
to acquire new skills. The prospective dimension refers to the reform of primary and secondary education,
in particular for children relying on public education.
(MC10) Bias on data-driven decision making—Since 2009, when President Barack Obama signed the
Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government (Ref. 2), government agencies have been engaged in
a race to make their data available. This has also pushed the private sector, non-governmental and international
organizations, and other actors to disclose data. In many cases, the released data lack quality, and their publication
is biased since only selected data are released while other related important data are not. When such data are used
by professionals involved in high-risk operations or governments in evidence-based, policy-making processes,
their decisions can result in severe risks and in negative consequences to individuals and large communities.
(MC11) Mitigating corruption—Despite the significant investments in digital government made by governments
around the world, and lately in open government that aims to promote transparency and accountability, there
are still unfulfilled yet promised benefits from those efforts. Most countries in the region are ranked poorly in
the corruption perceptions index (Ref. 3), which shows corrupt practices in the public sector. According to
Transparency International, the main reasons include weak institutions, efforts to undermine free and independent
media, control of civil society and international organizations, and increases in conflicts of interest and private
influence, among others (Ref. 4). Particularly related to digital technologies, governments do not have the
needed human, organizational, and institutional capacities to stand up to and counterbalance the power of IT
monopolies, who attempt to impose their own solutions and business models, regardless of the principle of
prioritizing the public good.
(MC12) Global companies versus local industries and small and medium enterprises (SMEs)—According to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in emerging-market economies, like
those in South America, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are responsible for up to 45% of jobs and up to
33% of national GDPs, and when the informal sector is included, some estimates are that SMEs contribute to
90% of total employment (Ref. 5). Based on this and considering the fulfilment of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), such as SDG #8—promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment, and decent
work for all; and SDG #9—promoting sustainable industrialization and fostering innovation, SMEs and local
industries constitute major enablers. However, in the region, they lack the capacities to compete with global
companies; they are shut out of the market due to lock-in policies and procedures from technology providers;
and they do not benefit from owned digital platforms. In addition, in most cases, they are unprotected by
national and regulatory frameworks.
(MC13) Acceptance of autonomous decision-making—Public and private institutions are increasingly relying
on artificial intelligence tools to serve customers, for example, using chatbots to respond online to users’ questions
24 h a day, seven days per week; and to implement autonomous decisions in information systems, for example,
using an algorithm relying on machine learning to select applicants for a job vacancy. Two main risks associated
with the adoption of new technologies include bias in automatic decision-making processes and discriminatory
practices adopted after selective training of the tools. The criteria for autonomous decision-making processes
should be transparent, and “black box” behavior (algorithms making decisions based on unknown or untraceable
rules) should be avoided, particularly in government services.
(MC14) Ethical dilemmas—Since digital technologies are now embedded in most of the activities that persons
perform in their daily lives, special attention should be paid to ethical issues arising from the use of new
technologies. Examples of ethical dilemmas include defining responsibility when decision-making is performed
autonomously by a software program, manipulating public opinion through online fake news, handling local
issues through lenses imposed by global issues disseminated through the internet and social media, and
externally influencing local leaders using digital means for creating chaos, among others. When making decisions
related to ethical dilemmas, we must consider that ethics is directly linked to culture and, therefore, agreed upon
according to the norms and principles of the local context.
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(MC15) Legal systems—Digital transformations affecting how individuals interact with each other and with
private and public institutions are having profound impacts, which, in most cases, are very difficult to foresee or
even estimate in advance. In addition, many of them happen without the proper and necessary legal bases to
legitimize how they are being conducted. This observation is valid beyond the South American context since it is
observed worldwide. However, in this region, particularly, most countries need to adjust their legal frameworks
to specify precisely what is allowed and what is forbidden regarding the use of new technologies. Furthermore,
it would be desirable to have an integrated regional view regarding country-specific legal frameworks, such as
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted by the European Union. Adopting an integrated
regional approach for legal systems is a critical matter considering that data can be easily moved across country
borders and that what is illegal in one country may be legal in another. Thus, competitive advantages are gained
by some countries to the detriment of others. Without the proper legal systems in place, there is a remarkably
unbalanced power relationship between common citizens and internet giants, and moreover, the failure of
governments to fulfill their responsibilities regarding the protection of citizens’ rights is exposed.
Ref. 1: Towards Homo Digitalis: Important Research Issues for Psychology and the Neurosciences at the Dawn
of the Internet of Things and the Digital Society. Available online: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/2/415
(accessed on 10 November 2019).
Ref. 2: President’s Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government - Interagency
Collaboration. Available online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2009/
m09-12.pdf (accessed on 10 November 2019).
Ref. 3: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Available online: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (accessed on
10 November 2019).
Ref. 4: Americas: weakening democracy and rise in populism hinder anti-corruption efforts. Available online:
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi-2018-regional-analysis-americas (accessed on 10 November
2019).
Ref. 5: Unlocking the potential of SMEs for the SDGs. Available online: https://oecd-development-matters.org/
2017/04/03/unlocking-the-potential-of-smes-for-the-sdgs/ (accessed on 10 November 2019).
4.3. Cluster Analysis
Given a coding and choice of distance measurement algorithm, the hierarchical CLA is a proven
exploratory structuring tool (see Section 3.2). Figure 3 presents the ways in which the MCs are related
to the domain-specific propositions (see the Y axis). There is no unanimous rule on what threshold of
the distance has to be taken in CLA. We took the distance threshold 10 for identifying clusters because
lower threshold would provide unrobust clustering (in the sense that few changes of the ratings would
result in a different clustering). Admittedly, this is a rough form of ordering as the CLA does not
consider the type of causality but just whether a joint causality is identified in the proposition and the
MCs. Nevertheless, Figure 3 helps in problem structuring.
The CLA presented in Figure 3 suggests the following interpretation. Cluster A comprises four
major societal impacts. These are smart cities’/regions’ rebounds (1), the threat of platform economics
on SMEs and the economic value of data (2), digital readiness (3), and global legal systems and
corruption (4). Three clusters involve people’s and decision-makers’ specific capabilities and ways
for coping with digital technologies. These are the genesis of the digital divide and the (poor) digital
literacy of South American countries, which are related (Cluster B). The acceptance of autonomous
decision-making tools and bias due to digital data show similar origins and/or impacts. Thus, the
process of opinion formation in a digital world calls for special attention (Cluster C). Cluster D
comprises social media (and its threat to democracy), vulnerable groups (which are often victims of
discrimination), and the (naïve) trust in unknown digital data, which are all related to ethical dilemmas.
Finally, Cluster E includes governmental capacity, seen as a highly specific general context factor that
may be involved (as it is uncorrelated) in all MCs.
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4.4. Initiating a Transdisciplinary Follow up Process in Brazil
By the end of the ERT, the majority of science experts were suggesting that a transdisciplinary
process should focus on corruption (MC11). The rationale was that corruption has the nature of
a specific, societally relevant, complex, and ill-defined problem whose management may benefit
from transdisciplinary processes. Thus, in November 2019, E. Luciano and R.W. Scholz presented
the outcomes of this paper, e.g., to 27 staff members of the Senate in Brazil, to 45 members of the
national Regional Digital Transformation Group, to a group of 4 members of the federal secretary
of Brazil, and to 59 planning-related members of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. The presentation
included, first, the features of the proposition-based ERTs and of transdisciplinarity as methodological
approaches for sustainable transition management; second, a detailed outline on how a project for the
mitigation of corruption as a subject of a transdisciplinary process (MitiCo; [47]) might be conducted,
and third, an overview of seven salient unseens that are expected to be of specific interest for Brazil.
These seven extracted points are strongly related to the clusters, yet they were presented in a way that
enabled the practitioners to gain insight into the range of unseens linked to the digital transition. Thus,
the practitioners were introduced to the principles and outcomes of a transdisciplinary process.
Given the definition of the MCs, the grouping by CLA, and specific demands expressed on the
following seven focus areas identified: (I) Mastery/ownership of digital data and algorithms are the
basic resources of societal wealth (digital data as a new currency; see MC6). As, unfortunately, Alphabet,
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft, and Alibaba are the owners of these resources (MC12), strategies
for retaining developmental autonomy are needed. (II) South America/Brazil is, most presumably, a loser
in the digital divide (MC1) as it is a late adopter and has difficult geographic infrastructures that call for
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expensive inclusion via high-performance transmission systems. (III) As the value chain is changing,
the question emerges whether small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs (i.e., SMEs, which account for 33%
of South America’s jobs) and digital entrepreneurs have a reasonable chance of survival in the Brazilian
economic system (MC12). We may face a platform economic lock-in. The promotion of clusters and
clusters/networks of digital entrepreneurs might become necessary. The lack of governance structure,
which is dependent on the advice of oligopolies (MC3), may also cause problems. Further, (IV), corruption
(MC11) is a main barrier to economic and social development. As digital communication transforms
how communication is conducted, corrupt activities may become more traceable. Yet, certain digital
technologies (browsers) may make tracing corruption more difficult. Therefore, corruption in a digital
world includes a demand for new or adjusted legal systems (as may be taken from Cluster A). (V) The
rebounds of smart cities and spatial transfer (MC8) are issues because (a) functional management may
not meet stakeholder demands; (b) the so-called smart city is a “middle class” concept and pushes those
who are “poorer” to the fringes (e.g., through gentrification), thereby increasing the spatial inequalities
between wealthy and poor urban areas; and (c) the high costs of changing digital municipal infrastructure
and lack of local technical know-how may cause unwanted lock-ins. (VI) As the value chain is being
transformed, the question emerges whether SMEs (comprising 33% of the jobs) and digital entrepreneurs
have a reasonable chance to survive in the Brazilian economic system (MC12). We may face a platform
economic lock-in, and the promotion of clusters and clusters/networks of digital entrepreneurs might
become necessary. Finally, (VII), South America is also suffering because the global phenomenon of
social media (including political bots) is jeopardizing democracy (MC6); digital readiness is lacking
(MC9). Such a process benefits when a targeted disciplinary process can be organized according to the
mechanisms described in the MCs.
The analysis and the transdisciplinary approach were unanimously appreciated in all meetings.
The suggestion to conduct the MitiCo project on corruption was welcomed. However, the key representatives
asked science for collaborative processes in other domains as well, such as increasing the adaptive capacity
of SMEs (III), identifying and managing rebounds of smart cities (V), or mitigating the unwanted impacts
of social media use (VII).
5. Discussion
The discussion first refers to the propositions as major elements of the ERT. Section 5.1 reflects
on the constructed methodology of problem-structuring by proposition-based ERTs and subsequent
transparent qualitative and quantitative content analysis on well-defined challenges of sustainable
transitioning. Then, the cluster of major concerns is assigned to levels of human and sociotechnical
systems (Section 5.2). Finally, Section 5.3 describes the overarching aspects of transdisciplinary
processes, including potential action domains for transdisciplinary follow-up processes and a case
study in Brazil.
5.1. Methodology of Problem Structuring by Proposition-Based ERTs
We can distinguish four major steps (see Figure 2). First, the formulation of propositions by
11 experts/expert groups. These propositions were secondly discussed with the focus on understanding
causal mechanisms and interrelations. These two data, third, became subject of a content analysis
and—for assuring some convergent validity, fourth, by a CLA. These rigidly standardized steps build
the foundation for providing seven potential domains for initiating a transdisciplinary process. Here the
selection was also affected by some constraints of the case of Brazil. The method and the results were
highly appreciated in a series of interactions with administrative institutions and executive officers.
We can see two contributions of the present paper. First, we think that the presented four steps
procedure may be viewed as a contribution to problem structuring methods [34,48] as they have
been developed in soft operational research. Second, the presented method substantiates knowledge
generation in transdisciplinary processes. The input of scientists from 11 different disciplines could be
integrated [49]. Thus, we can see a contribution to research- and targeted interdisciplinarity-based
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transdisciplinarity or deliberative transdisciplinarity. The presented results may be well used in the
follow up processes when relating science and stakeholder knowledge (see Figure 1).
5.2. Scientific Outcomes for Understanding the Systems
We will subsequently discuss what unseens have been identified by the South American science
experts on different levels.
5.2.1. Aspects Related to Individual Behavior
The individual perception that culminates in the level of trust in unknown data has been addressed
in many propositions and perspectives (P2, P6, P9, on digital democracy; P26–29). Especially under
the dark side of ICT perspective, the argument is that “the trustfulness and reliability of information
agreements and recommender systems are questionable.” The knowledge about which information
should be trusted and believed [2], especially in this era of fake news—which may, in fact, be stimulated
by traditional media (discussion on P28)—is considered to be a new challenge in the individual’s life.
In addition, the loss of privacy (e.g., when profiling a person) and the potential risk of rationalization of
controversial behavior (e.g., racial profiling) may affect individuals’ perceptions, trust, and acceptance
of the outcomes.
The new dynamics of information, including the increasing amount and speed of information flow
(P26, P20) and the reinforcing algorithms in the digital curtain of social media, are preventing a diversity
of information, which, in turn, may endanger democracy. This type of digital participation or collective
decision-making that includes a relatively homogeneous group of citizens may exclude vulnerable
groups, thereby increasing social polarization and an inability to effectively overcome marginalization
(P12). This is especially relevant for South America since the region has many vulnerable populations
(the number living below the poverty limit is estimated at 40% of the population) (P2).
As emphasized by the cluster, there are also ethical dilemmas between functional management
aspects of smart cities and stakeholder demands. General ethical/moral principles that buffer ethically
unreasoned demands from dominant “internet collectives” (the ethical dimension of collective internet
decision-making) may cause harm.
5.2.2. The Role of Governmental Organizations
Digitalization in the public sector follows an evolutionary process of adopting necessary capabilities
and models of electronic and smart government (which refers to transformational efforts through the
introduction of ICT in governmental organizations and the effort to promote stakeholder engagement),
followed by the development of effective smart governance settings and the collaborative environment
that characterizes them [50]. As a consequence of the digital transformation, governments are now
facing new challenges that require shifts in the way they deliver public services, and this, in turn,
requires a user-driven administration.
The main concern in regard to the lack of government capacity appears to be related to many
propositions, perspectives, and identified unseens (Digital infrastructure—P1, P3; Rebounds of SC—P10;
Economic change—role as regulator—P13, 15, 17, 18; Digital democracy—P25–P29, Corruption P33–35,
and Digital currencies—P37). The main capacities include specialized knowledge and resources, both
organizational and institutional. New governance models could help to strengthen their capacities.
In the specific case of corruption in Brazil, digital government could be used as a tool for anticorruption
practices and to fight a “cultural legacy” of corruption, which requires improving the government’s
capacities to take action and a multi-stakeholder process.
5.2.3. Societies
Societies in South America face several development challenges. The level of ICT infrastructure
and connectivity in South America is low compared with developed countries; for example, the region
is below the world average for fixed broadband (P1). A study conducted among 139 countries revealed
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that an increase of 10 percent in fixed broadband penetration yielded an increase in 0.8 percent in
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita [51]. Thus, governments of South American nations need
to invest in digital infrastructure to ensure that digital technologies do not contribute to increasing
the already-existing socioeconomic gaps, i.e., by increasing economic gaps due to the digital divide.
To reduce the digital divide, they also need to dedicate efforts to creating human capacity for residents
to benefit from digital services, as well as capacities in local industries and SMEs that will enable them
to compete in new digital markets, thus, contributing to employment and improving local community
conditions (P3).
Another risk increasing socioeconomic gaps associated with new digital developments in cities is
related to the gentrification processes that are occurring as a consequence of smart-city initiatives and
city development (P11). In South American cities, the process reveals significantly large socioeconomic
differences between residents whose good quality of life benefits from various kinds of digital products
and services, while large communities living in slums in peripheral areas of these cities face severe
subsistence problems. However, as another side of the coin, access to digital devices could help
people in slums to frog-leap in terms of economic and social development, before physical living
conditions are improved. Another major opportunity of digital transformation, particularly in the
region, is the potential use of digital technologies to define new anticorruption practices that consider
specific cultural aspects of the region (P35). For all of these, governments need to ensure that legal
systems are revised and adapted to protect citizens as well as SMEs and local industries’ rights and to
make sure that these kinds of divides existing in societies are not amplified by digital transformations.
5.2.4. The Sociotechnical Systems
New sociotechnical systems arising from the use of emerging technologies are serving as mirrors,
amplifying and clearly revealing unwanted human behaviors. For example, the use of artificial intelligence
algorithms, like those based on machine learning, may use available data, which might exhibit bias
existing in societies; in such cases, they will exhibit bias in their decision-making processes (P2).
Moreover, if such systems are applied by governments to make decisions about eligibility criteria for
providing a public service or not, or for selecting one person over another for employment, this can
unintentionally discriminate against individuals (P5). In addition, intelligent systems having the capacity
to make autonomous decisions may not make decisions that align with or are expected by the local
culture (P4). For example, the global survey conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(http://moralmachine.mit.edu/) about decisions made by an autonomous car showed that the selected
decisions vary among Eastern and Western cultures. In addition, new sociotechnical systems must
realize the value of data and how it is considered as a new currency of digital economies, and in light
of this, they must take into account all the actions necessary to ensure proper data management that
protects the rights of those who own the data.
5.3. Brazilian Case Study for Transdisciplinary Processes and Reorganizing Science
The proposition-based ERT can be seen as an instrument to draw scientists’ attention to the
of sustainable digital environments and as a means to initiate a transdisciplinary process. This has
already worked effectively with the European ERT [2], which launched the Digital Data as a Subject of
a Transdisciplinary Process (DiDaT) project in Germany [40]. About 50 scientists and 50 practitioners
are involved in a process of mutual learning. In fact, the model of the DiDaT project and the idea of
a transdisciplinary process was unanimously welcomed at all meetings and discussions, which include
approximately 150 representatives of institutions. The ERT defined and formulated a science perspective
that considered what unseens might become subjects of transdisciplinary science–practice discourses that
may benefit from relating different types of knowledge in order to efficaciously master complex, relevant
societal challenges [14]. The first feedback of a series of interactions from the side of administrative
practitioners was overwhelmingly positive. We will see whether the science community will demonstrate
a similar positive reaction. As it currently appears, there is emerging knowledge on the processes,
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dynamics, and impacts of the digital transition on different scales. The bottleneck, rather, seems to be
the preparedness of science for transdisciplinary processes, and this may hold true not only for South
America. Finding a sufficient number of scientists who are able to facilitate a transdisciplinary process,
who can go beyond their inner-science core activities and join a (potentially time-consuming) process
of mutual learning with practice, and who have the institutional and financial resources to participate,
co-manage, and co-lead transdisciplinary processes is, unfortunately, both challenging and rare. We hope
that this will change, for instance, by institutionalizing sustainability science and research at the level of
the university.
5.4. Strengths and Limits of the Presented Method
The proposition based ERT is based on the idea of triangulation by perspectives. We invited science
experts from five different South American countries to provide written propositions (of a certain
format [8]. Naturally, the mode of selection (first list and phone chain were done by three authors) may
cause bias or exclude some important issues though there is transparency of defining perspectives
and propositions. The selection of the 91 key statements and their condensation to 15 MCs by two
authors embodies the subjectivity of any content analysis. The grouping of the CLA includes these
uncertainties, i.e., the cluster formation has been based on whether statements between MCs were
identified in the same propositions (and thus also perspectives). The weakness of the method is that it
is subjective and exploratory and best allows for face validity. Its strength is that provides a transparent
problem structuring for unseeens of the digital transformation.
The current analysis of the ERT went further than the European ERT. This has been due that
the expert discussion on the propositions did not only focus on similarities among propositions but
focused on the identification of causalities. Thus, the definition of the unseens in Section 4.2 (and
“Figure 2”) were enriched by the causal arguments. Yet, a formal methodology what causal factors
should be included when is missing. For instance, the lack of Legal Systems is a major concern (MC15)
but simultaneously a causal factor of lack of government capacity (MC3) and of global companies
endangering smes (MC12). The authors suggest that causality analysis underlying the MCs such as
between the MCs should be developed and included in the proposition-based ERTs. Nevertheless,
the present method and paper presents a structuring of the overly complex multitude of unseens.
We could learn also from the Brazil follow-up transdisciplinary process, which this structuring supports
in the communication of mitigating unseens.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we present the main messages of a South American Roundtable (ERT) on the
unintended side effects of digital transformation. Based on 39 propositions from 19 experts representing
11 different perspectives, a two-day ERT discussed the main drivers and challenges (presented in
well-elaborated propositions), as well as vulnerabilities or unseens. The science experts provided
suggestions on: (i) what the mechanisms underlying major unseens are; (ii) how rebound effects of
digital transformation may become the subject of overarching research in three main categories of
impact: development factors, society, and individuals; and (iii) a set of potential action domains for
transdisciplinary follow-up processes.
Among the contextual factors, the lack of governance capacity plays a critical role in most of the
perspectives. This flaw is characterized by a low human, organizational, and institutional capacity and
the lack of ability to adapt to the rapid changes introduced by digital transformations. Given the power
of global IT companies, the lack of government capacity results in the dependency of governmental
decisions on the advice of oligopolies that may sell technologies that have the potential to cause
rebound effects in South American smart cities, as they are not sufficiently adjusted to the specific
situation (e.g., strong financial and social constraints). In this context, the question also arises of who
the owner is, i.e., who has access to the digital data and algorithms needed to properly participate in
the global value chain and to generate societal wealth is an important factor.
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The societally related unseens are mostly negative and address mainly global challenges such as
digital divides, rebound effects of smart cities, and the vulnerability of sensitive groups. The digital
divide refers to the unequal development of ICT industries in developed and developing countries.
Promoting smart cities may be linked to a high risk of gentrification. These conclusions hold true for
Brazil and many other countries of South America. But, in addition, the urban/rural area divide can
become greater when smart cities and regions are promoted. Connected to the ongoing digitalization
of all (critical) infrastructures, the lack of IT governance capabilities in local government may induce
a risk of technological lock-in on a city scale as changing suppliers may become very costly. Vulnerable
groups may also face the challenges of digitalization, especially considering the possibility of bias
in algorithms or in data, where AI applications may replicate unwanted human behaviors such as
manipulation, prejudice, and discrimination.
The acceptance of autonomous decisions, together with technocratic trust and digital readiness,
form the category of unseens related to individuals. A cluster-based content analysis of the propositions
and related mechanisms was applied for conversion validity as an additional semi-quantitative
procedure of structuring. The CLA resulted in five clusters that comprise societal impacts (Cluster A),
involve people’s and decision-makers’ specific capabilities and ways of coping with digital technologies
(Clusters B, C, and D), and a general contextual factor (Cluster E), related to the government capacity
as a factor that drives or hinders (when lacking) economic and social development as an output of
digital transformation.
The paper discusses general critical impacts such as the digital divide that affects most countries
that are not included in key digital businesses (such as platform economics, the development of AI-based
industrial and/or business innovations, or digital infrastructure development) or the challenge of
restructuring small- and medium-sized enterprises whose service is digitally substituted. We also identify
specific factors and effects for most of the countries of South America, such as a lack of governmental
structure, challenging geography (e.g., inclusion in high-performance transmission power), or the digital
readiness of (wide parts) of society. The applied method included a proposition-process ERT and
a thorough content analysis using CLA as a structuring method. Thus, we consider the presented process
as a problem-structuring method. This structuring is valuable, in particular, for analyzing, describing,
and perhaps even developing a new field of research that we might call adaptive governance. Adaptive
governance calls for not only identifying vulnerabilities and unseens. We must also understand their
genesis, i.e., the constraints, causes, mechanisms, and dynamics underlying the digital transformation
and, in particular, the causal chains underlying “wanted/positive” and “unwanted/negative” effects.
The knowledge of these processes can be seen as a prerequisite of successful and effective transdisciplinary
processes as well as strategic sustainability management and planning in the overly complex process of
the digital transition.
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Appendix A. Propositions on the Future Perspectives on Digital Transition
Appendix A.1. Propositions on Digital Infrastructure: New Governance Models for Sustainable Development:
Elsa Estevez
Proposition A1. On average, South America lacks the needed capacities to fully benefit from digital
infrastructures (Needed ICT capacities).
Summary: Different types of capacities are needed for a society to fully benefit from digital
infrastructures, such as the availability and affordability of digital devices, connectivity, human skills
and public policies promoting the use of digital products. Compared with developed regions, South
America needs important investments to further develop most of such capacities, and such efforts face
serious challenges.
Comment: There are four types of factors enabling a community to benefit from digital
eco-systems [52]: (1) infrastructure—including networks, data processing, storage facilities and devices;
(2) connectivity—services enabling to connect to the Internet; (3) human skills—individual’s competencies
enabling the consumption of digital services; and (4) policy context—regulations contributing to developing
sustainable and scalable digital solutions. Analysing the infrastructure, South America needs to improve
the LTE/WIMAX coverage (the average is 69.1, while the average in Europe is 92.2, and in America as a
whole is 77.4); and the percentage of households with computers (the average is 46.5, while in Europe is 79.6
and in America 64.90). Regarding connectivity, all indicators show that South America lags significantly
behind Europe and America. In addition, the region is below the world average in fixed broadband (11.23
versus 12.4), the percentage of households with Internet access (42.04 versus 51.5), and the international
internet bandwidth per Internet user (65.41 versus 74.5). Concerning human skills, the average in South
America (6.66) is below the average of high income (8.15) and upper-middle income (6.91) countries,
however it is higher than the world average (5.85). Revising the policy context, prices paid for mobile
devices and connectivity in South America are almost double, except for the 1GB mobile broadband
that is about 10 times more than prices paid in Europe. Considering the regional context, ensuring the
needed investments for improving the regional capacities is challenging, due to: (1) vast, mountainous,
and jungle territory (the total territory is 17.84 million km2 compared to 10.18 million in Europe) and small
population (422 million, compared to 741 million in Europe), resulting in low population density (one third
of Europe density); and (2) governments in the region possess low capacity and weak institutions, among
others. The costs of needed ICT capacities are one reason for increasing the global digital divide related to
developing countries.
Proposition A2. The contribution of digital infrastructures to sustainable digital environments can only be
assessed if there is a clear understanding of how the infrastructures are empowering or disempowering people
(Side-effects of digital infrastructures).
Summary: A digital infrastructure provides media to access and share information and to
collaboratively create new knowledge. As an enabler of knowledge-societies, such infrastructures
contribute to the empowerment and development of individuals and communities. However, in many
cases, people are unaware of how much personal information they are sharing and how such information
is used by the infrastructure providers for hidden purposes.
Comment: Digital infrastructures enable the provision of personalized services [53], appealing to
their users based on user’s data possessed by the infrastructure. For example, knowing preferences
and information about their life, Facebook suggests users to link with old friends and offers selling
products they like. Despite the appealing services, there are side-effects that require critical assessment.
On the positive side, the infrastructure contributes to empower people through access to information
and facilities for sharing user-generated content. On the negative side, infrastructure providers can
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use content provided by users against them. For instance, it is well-known how the 2016 United
States presidential elections and the United Kingdom Brexit referendum have been influenced by
“psychological warfare” facilitated by user’s information leaked from Facebook [54]. Keeping in mind
that “the world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil but data” [55], there is a need to reassert
who is empowered through the usage of digital infrastructures. If proper legal frameworks are not in
place, while the selling argument of digital infrastructures is to empower people, the huge amount
of information collected through them seems to empower a handful of already powerful digital
monopolies or Internet giants. Another scenario requiring assessment relates to the opportunities
that they offer to groups representing unheard voices in the society. While such groups use digital
infrastructures to openly share their political opinions at a low cost and without censorship, many
governments have responded by demonizing and attacking them [56]. Given the research gap in
impact assessment of digital infrastructure usage, efforts should focus on investigating frameworks
for their transparent usage, how power is delegated through such infrastructures, legal aspects for
ensuring user’s protection, as well as on building human capacity for raising awareness about the
consequences of their usage.
Proposition A3. Policy makers are losing the race to develop and enact laws that protect citizen rights while
global companies are taking advantages of new business models enabled by digital infrastructures (Government
weaknesses and oligopolists digital power).
Summary: The underestimated amount of user behavioural data collected by digital infrastructures
has become the most powerful tool for targeted marketing. Powerful private companies are investing
considerable efforts in designing services for users to spend as much time and resources (including
personal data) as possible within their owned platforms. At the same time, governments are late to
react in regulating such practices, leaving citizens unprotected.
Comment: Internet giants have powerful resources to collect and process user’s personal
information gathered through their owned digital platforms. They process information in the “context
of prediction algorithms, an omniscient, opaque machinery that threatens to erode the very foundation
of privacy”. In addition, they have the ability to dictate user’s attention by determining which content
is shown to them [57]. For example, Luca et al. [58] demonstrate that Google increasingly develops
and promotes its own content and that the mechanism they use to show search results “would lower
the chances of consumers finding the products they need by one-third”. Internet giants, like Google,
Amazon, and Facebook, are “benefiting from the network effects whereby the popularity of a service
attracts more users and thus becomes self-perpetuating”. Thus, a main risk is the likelihood that they
benefit from the commons by capturing the value derived from their information, and while doing it,
they are precluding others from doing the same [59]. Filippi and Vieira explain that “the content holder
has become as powerful as, if not more powerful than, the copyright owner” [59]. Given the facts,
digital infrastructures, governed by few oligopolists, are creating a kind of “digital curtain” between
our presence in the digital (virtual) world and the real (physical) world. In such scenario, governments
become a kind of administrator of large trade of (social) values and products. This is particularly
relevant in Latin America given that 78.4% of Internet users participate in social media (compared to
63.6% global average) [60], local industry and SMEs are usually not resourceful and do lack capacity to
compete, and governments are losing the race to enact laws that protect civil and SME rights in front of
Internet giant practices.
Appendix A.2. Propositions on Artificial Intelligence: Social Impacts of Algorithmic-Based Recommendations:
Carlos Chesñevar
Proposition A4. Ubiquity of Agreement Technologies in Digital Society will have a deep impact in human-based
decision making (Adaptation to integrated agreement technologies).
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Summary: AI-based tools and technologies will become ubiquitous in sustainable digital environments;
rather than operating on a “stand-alone mode”, such tools will have to negotiate and carry out agreements.
Citizens should become increasingly aware (and educated) of the rationales underlying mechanisms for
decision making using these technologies.
Comment: Agreement technologies (AT) [61,62] refer to computer systems in which autonomous
software agents negotiate with one another (typically on behalf of humans) in order to come to mutually
acceptable agreements. An agent may choose whether to fulfil an agreement or not, and it should fulfil
it when there is an obligation to do so derived from the standing agreements. Autonomy, interaction,
mobility and openness are key concepts studied within the AT approach. In the last decade, AI-based
tools of different kinds have evolved to become ubiquitous to provide “agreement metaphors” for
different aspects of everyday life. Thus, provided the proper context is given, a user searching for
“Mars” in a browser when looking for candies should get different results from an astronomer searching
for the same term. Similarly, searching for a restaurant on the mobile phone in a particular city provides
different results according to the user’s location. It is expected that the combination of different user
features (providing suitable “contexts”) will lead to expanded capabilities in AI-based tools. Some
recent aspects where these elements have been analyzed include modelling social empowerment
via social networks (e.g., as in [63], where “agreement” in public opinion can be abstracted away as
a “cloud of statements” in a social network which correspond to different user contents have a similar
sentiment towards a particular keyword). In this setting, a possible unseen is how citizens will perceive
and adapt to enriched “agreements” or contracts (which will become more and more sophisticated as
AI tools evolve. To give an example, current social networks “suggest” a person as a potential friend.
The user “agrees” to give some degree of belief to such suggestions. In the future it is expected that
more context-based information is involved, so that humans will probably delegate more complex
“agreements” to AI tools.
Proposition A5. Explanation abilities expected from AI technologies will play a major role, resulting in a social
demand for improved recommendation and explanation capabilities in future sustainable digital environments.
(AI-tools & recommendation capabilities).
Summary: One of the most requested AI-based services is connected with recommendations of
different kinds in different online services (Amazon, Booking.com, Netflix, etc.). Current deployments
use mostly quantitative metaphors (stars, rankings, etc.), which are not naturally connected with
human-centric explanation abilities. New metaphors are expected to emerge.
Comment: Recommender systems [64] represent an important addition to different online
platforms in our current digital society where the user is confronted with many choices. To come up
with recommendations, recommender systems usually rely on user preferences, popularity indexes,
or on similarity measures defined between users or contents, which are computed on the basis of
methods coming from the social sciences, the information retrieval or the machine learning communities
(see [64]). Although the effectiveness of these kind of recommenders is remarkable, there are significant
limitations [63,65]. On the one hand, these quantitative models are not equipped with mechanism
to revise previous conclusions; thus, given that the dynamic nature of user preferences usually
leads to conflictive and incomplete domain information, these recommenders deal poorly with changes
in preferences. On the other hand, these quantitative approaches do not have a clean underlying
model that is easily understandable by the user (thus providing “brittle” explanations to support
recommendations). As mentioned in [63,65], qualitative explanations are relevant because users prefer
recommendations when they can understand the reasons behind its selection. We contend that one of
the “unseens” related to the growing popularity of recommendation services is associated with the
lack of human-centric explanation abilities (involving e.g., qualitative issues that should go beyond
providing a bunch of reviews written by other human beings. In future digital environments, there
will be an increasing need and demand of enriched explanation capabilities supporting AI-tools.
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In this setting, evolving argumentation technologies [63,65] might play a meaningful role in providing
rationally justified decision processes. Trust, manipulation, provenance, and reputation are also
relevant issues, including the question whether a recommendation from an individual or a program
might receive more (behavioral) acceptance, as well as the impact of such recommendations in
education, culture, wealth, and poverty issues in South America.
Proposition A6. Increasing role of AI tools in sustainable digital environments will require redefining ethical
issues and social contracts with an impact on cognitive smart cities. (Ethics for AI and smart cities).
Summary: The evolution of the Internet of Things (IoT) will contribute to provide new sources for
building a “digital public opinion” of anything (cars, people, organizations, etc.). This digital image
will clash eventually with the needs and requirements of cognitive smart cities, involving new ethical
issues related to AI technologies.
Comment: As pointed out in [66], the development of smart cities and their fast-paced deployment
is resulting in the generation of large quantities of data at unprecedented rate. This calls for a new
generation of approaches to cope with the phenomenon of “wasting unlabeled data” [66]. As pointed
out in [66], even though there have been several discussions on the management of big data in the
context of smart cities, there is still no clear answer on how to use the enormous amounts of collected
data. At the same time, different stakeholders in society (organizations, politicians, citizens in general,
etc.) will be more and more recognizable in terms of a “digital image”, generated from data coming
different sources. Social networks, for example, can help provide data for performing consumer insight
mining [67]. Cognitive smart cities [66] refer to the convergence of the emerging Internet of Things
(IoT) and smart city technologies, their generated big data and AI techniques. In this context, a possible
“unseen” is the clash between the “digital image” of different stakeholders in society and needs and
requirements in cognitive smart cities, resulting in new ethical dilemmas. Ethical dilemmas refer to
situations in which any available choice leads to infringing some accepted ethical principle and yet
a decision has to be made [68,69]. As pointed out in [69,70], the AI research community realizes that
machine ethics is a determining factor to the extent autonomous systems are permitted to interact with
humans. These ethical dilemmas will have an even bigger impact when considered in the context of
collective ethical decision-making, which might include the redefinition of traditional social contracts
in society. Argumentation-based explainable AI (see, e.g., [65]) can be a good approach suited to the
consequentialist ethics, commonly adopted approach for implementing AI ethics.
Appendix A.3. Propositions on the Dark Side of ICT: Luiz Antonio Joia
Proposition A7. Developing countries are implementing ICT trying to pursue the concept of “development”
as understood and applied in developed countries. Yet, this will not fulfill their actual needs and solve their
developmental challenges. (ICT in developing countries).
Comment: Some time ago, a debate arose regarding whether or not the developing countries
should invest their scarce monetary resources in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) [71].
In other words, is it relevant and does it make sense for developing countries to develop its own
ICT projects when faced with such vast and pressing socio-economic dilemmas and challenges? This
debate is now considered unfounded, as it has since then been verified that ICT implementation is
of paramount importance for developing countries [72]. Thus, the crux of the matter is not whether
ICT initiatives must be undertaken in developing countries, but rather which ICT endeavors should
be chosen to contribute to the country’s development. The ICT potential for the development of
developing countries is no longer in doubt, as several scholars have expounded on the developmental
impacts accrued from ICT [73–78]. However, it is also true that ICT projects in developing countries
striving for the development of the region are far from being a universal success, as several have fallen
short of their intended outcomes [71]. Therefore, the key issue on that is what does “development”
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mean for developing countries [79,80]? That is to say, does the word “development” have the same
meaning for developing and developed countries in the world [80]? Or, are ICT endeavors just
reinforcing socio-economic gaps that are already found in the developing countries [81]?
Proposition A8. The heavy use of social media is fostering popular demonstrations worldwide, which will lead to
an increasing distrust with political constituted leaderships and by consequence growing crises of representation.
(Social media and popular movements).
Comment: Democracy is one of the factors that favor the emergence of popular demonstrations [82].
One can also cite the economic condition and a demanding agenda, as other conditions capable of
triggering social movements [83]. According to Lugão et al. [84], in Europe, for example, several
countries have hosted popular protests against the austerity policies adopted since 2012, as a result
of the international economic crisis of 2008. In Brazil, as pointed out by Ramos and Oliveira [85]
and Joia [86], the events of 2013 were sparked off by the yearning of the population for a political
agenda that met their expectations and needs. In addition to that, for Castells [87], the digital networks
represent the new social morphology of our societies, since the diffusion of network logic substantially
modifies the operation and results of production processes, experience, power and culture. In this way,
the Internet is more than a means of communication or a working tool; it is also an essential means
of interaction and organization for contemporary networked society [88]. Based on that, Shirky [89]
stresses that demonstrations with summons for physical presence are organized by mobilization on
social media and, from that point onwards, demonstrate their strength with the massive presence
of people on the street, united around a call for change. Castells [83] and Papic and Noonan [90]
also explain that social media-enabled popular demonstrations have neither leaders nor hierarchy,
mimicking the horizontality of the network, thereby reflecting distrust with constituted leaderships
and leading to growing crises of representation. These characteristics are intentional and have strategic
significance, since organizations gains strength against possible oppression via distributed networks,
since there is no central point of control that can be repressed or controlled.
Proposition A9. The heavy use of smartphones has generated both positive and negative consequences for
their users, thereby developing paradoxes that lead to the emergence of tensions and anxieties that are sources of
paralysis for the users. (Tensions, anxieties, and the heavy use of smartphones).
Comment: The increasing penetration of smartphones around the world shows the importance of
the technology and the concept of being connected as a way of implementing the idea of belonging to
contemporary humankind. Thus, this new order represented by the growing importance of access
to information and the possibility of being permanently connected is significantly changing the
social dynamics, permitting new forms of collaboration and interaction [91–93]. Yet, studies about
technological paradoxes have claimed that information and communication technology (ICT) adoption
has generated both positive and negative consequences associated with its use by people, who are most
of the time unaware of them [94,95]. According to Barjis et al. [96], mobile wireless technologies, such as
smartphones, have redefined the social dynamics via new modus-operandi. Thus, at the same time as
smartphones are used in the daily lives of individuals, contributing to more agile communications,
they can also provoke addiction, anxiety, and encroachment on the free time of these individuals [94,95].
In sum, the ambiguities and paradoxes arising from the heavy use of smartphones generate internal
conflicts in users that need to be administrated by them [97]. Thus, it is important for people to be
aware of the conflicting aspects associated with the heavy use of smartphones, in order to develop
coping strategies that can range from neglecting ambiguities, accepting them, or challenging and
defying them [98,99].
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Appendix A.4. Propositions on the Rebounds of Smart Cities: Maria Alexandra Cunha and João Porto de
Albuquerque
The stage of development in smart cities in South America: Although ‘smart city’ is a research
term used in several fields of knowledge, a lack of consensus remains regarding the theme [100].
The term ‘smart’ is associated with the development of solutions to urban problems using technology.
The ‘smart’ wave succeeds the term e-government, which is older and, perhaps for this reason, more
widely studied, and is linked to the modernization of the public sector with the use of information
and communication technology (ICT) to improve the efficiency of the operational and administrative
processes of governments [101]. It is also associated with the use of the internet in the public sector
to provide online services and to expand democratic practices [102]. Both e-government and smart
city initiatives rely on technology infrastructure, hardware, software, networks, the internet, services
and applications, and the use that local governments make of them. In Latin America, e-government
projects have been in place since the late 1990s. Since then, and despite the efforts of governments,
ICT usage and management in Latin American cities remains deficient. For example, the Brazilian
context shows low use of technology in governmental processes. ICT infrastructure is poor, and great
challenges have to be overcome when it comes to ICT governance and management [103]. Besides the
inequality among local governments, it is important to note the lack of skilled staff to manage IT in
smaller local governments and/or more remote regions.
Proposition A10. There are wide disparities in the competencies of IT Governance in Latin American cities.
IT governance models are required that consider these uneven capabilities of cities and their development. There is
a risk of technological lock-in on a city-wide scale (IT Governance).
Comment: Smart city initiatives rely on technology infrastructure, e.g., hardware, software,
networks, the internet, services and applications. In Latin America, e-government projects have
been in place since the late 1990s. Since then, and despite the efforts of governments, ICT usage and
management in Latin American cities remains deficient. For example, the Brazilian context shows
low use of technology in governmental processes. ICT infrastructure is poor, and great challenges
have to be overcome when it comes to ICT governance and management [103]. Besides the inequality
among local governments, it is important to note the lack of skilled staff to manage IT in smaller local
governments and/or more remote regions. IT governance models are required that consider this gap in
the skills of staff. Associated with IT resource management, IT governance models should consider
developing IT skills in short and successive cycles. E-government public policies recommending
generic principles in Latin America, imported from cities of the global North, may not have achieved
the expected effects, and this may also occur in the case of smart city initiatives [104]. The research of
e-government and smart cities in developing countries should consider the steps that must be taken at
the municipal level, especially those steps that should be taken to acquire IT management capabilities.
The challenges are not trivial and actions that consider differences among cities can leverage results.
Regarding an “unseen” effect, this context of a lack of IT management capabilities could mean the
risk of technological lock-in on a city-wide scale. The asymmetry of information between public
administrators responsible for IT in the city level and local and/or global technology providers could
lead cities in Latin America and other regions around the globe to become hostages of technology
platforms in long-term contracts. The maintenance costs for technological infrastructure are a common
problem in cities around the world, but cities in Latin America have additional difficulties related to
their lack of skilled staff and consequent dependence on IT companies. This means that cities would
become dependent on technology and services that they are not capable of maintaining, let alone of
further developing to suit their evolving needs.
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Proposition A11. Latin American cities are characterized by spatial inequalities. More developed regions are
surrounded by areas of poverty and vulnerability. Smart city initiatives that disregard these inequalities may
accentuate them. (Spatial inequalities).
Comment: Researchers who investigate the spatial implications of smart city initiatives have pointed
out the risk of gentrification [105]. Gentrification was a localized phenomenon in some suburbs of big
cities in the 1960s [106] but is now taking place in cities of all sizes in all regions of the globe [107].
Using digital technology to improve neighbourhoods in Latin American cities, may cause gentrification
in these areas, for instance due to higher real estate prices, that will make them inaccessible for
impoverished citizens. Large cities in Latin America are generally made up of a central region that is often
an important municipality, sometimes even a state or national capital, surrounded by neighborhoods
and/or municipalities subject to poverty and a number of vulnerabilities and deprivations. In addition to
“pushing” people to poorer regions, smart city initiatives may also be pushing problems to these same
regions. As a result, spatial inequalities will be accentuated. There will be islands with better social
indicators and, at the same time, peripheral regions with worsening development indicators. Measuring
the impact of smart city initiatives must go beyond the frontiers of target neighbourhoods and cities,
which are often wealthier than the surrounding areas. In Latin America, with a large part of the
population living in urban agglomerations, indicators must be developed that measure the impact of
these initiatives considering spatial inequalities. If these inequalities are disregarded, the positive impacts
of smart cities initiatives can be overestimated by only measuring wealthier regions, leaving “unseen” the
effects in surrounding deprived areas. This can cause an “ecological fallacy” in which average indicators
are improved, but the poorer population have to struggle with greater inequality.
Proposition A12. In smart cities, technologies for digital participation have an ambiguous character between
empowerment and instrumentality. The way citizens are engaged in the process of data production is as important
as the data generated itself (instrumental digital participation).
The dissemination of digital technologies has generated a sustained interest in initiatives that
seek to involve citizens and communities in the generation of data. The potential for democratisation
and empowerment of eParticipation and citizen-generated data has not only been acknowledged by
grassroots advocacy and activist groups but is also increasingly promoted by a wide-range of mainstream
actors such as humanitarian organisations [108] and the United Nations Programme for Human
Settlements [109]. Smart city initiatives have also emphasised the role of digital participation [110] and
in fact, a recent report by McKinsey Global Institute proposes that smart cities are entering a “new
phase” of citizen-centric initiatives [111]. However, alongside this acknowledgement of the potential
for citizen data production, there is a growing body of literature that offers more critical perspectives.
For instance, they point out structural barriers in the society that may prevent some social groups
of producing or interpreting big data [112]. This could create a ‘delusion of democratisation’ [113]
by increasing participation only within a relatively homogeneous group of citizens, which is unable
to effectively overcome marginalisation issues [114]. Furthermore, the designed technologies may
follow externally defined “programmes of participation” [115], enabling pre-defined practices of
data production which do not necessarily allow contestation or empowerment [116]. As argued
by Albuquerque and Almeida [108] the contradictory views on citizen data production are due
to a constitutive ambivalence of “citizen sensing”: it can mean that citizens will develop enlarged
capabilities of perceiving phenomena and articulating alternative worldviews (and thus empowerment);
or alternatively, citizen’s capabilities can be reduced to equate a sensorial device to capture (mostly
pre-defined) environmental signals (thus implying instrumentality). Should this constitutive tension
be left “unseen” in purportedly “citizen-centric” smart city initiatives, even if citizens are given
the opportunity to produce data (and thus “speak”), they could be doing so by only following the
possibilities foreseen in the digital technologies, which could be resting on a set of non-problematised
(and potentially problematic) ontological assumptions and interests. Real citizen empowerment can
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only be achieved in the participative production of data by giving attention to the form and process
with which the relationship between the public sector and citizens are established, i.e., to the modes of
engagement between citizens, government, and digital technologies.
Appendix A.5. Propositions on Economic Change: Carlos O. Quandt, Alex Antonio Ferraresi and Eduardo
Damião da Silva
Proposition A13. Digital readiness of the labor force (ability to adapt to digital work).
Comment: The global trend of automation of manual work and some types of analytic work
affects the economic system and institutions. The concept of “digital readiness” applies not only
to industries, but to the labor force as well. Even though access to information has become almost
universal, the supply of professional education and labor qualification in the region has not been
restructured to provide effective qualifications so that workers are prepared for the impacts of the
digital transition in the labor market. Changes are much faster than the ability of regional governments
to regulate labor practices and to offer training to the labor force; unemployment in the region is
already high, and overall skill levels are low. Frey and Osborne [117] estimate that almost half of
all the new jobs require high skills. Digitization is likely to contribute to labor market polarization,
assuming that low- and middle-skill jobs are more susceptible to automation. The repatriation of
activities previously outsourced to low-income countries by the most developed countries is also likely
to occur [118]. The uncertainties and challenges for local economies to adapt is high. Education and
training are still geared toward traditional professional roles. This is not limited to well-defined areas
such as computer science or engineering, but also to the need for the development of trans-disciplinary
capabilities. These transcend formally accredited academic disciplines and agencies, and include other
kinds of tacit, non-specialist knowledge from practitioners and local communities, as well as non-linear
thinking, creativity, entrepreneurship, communication and problem-solving skills, all of which are
harder to automate. The effects may be delayed in the region if investment takes longer than expected
to be shifted to the development of the required technology, to change organizational processes and
practices, and consequently to promote its diffusion in the regional economic system.
Proposition A14. Digitalization labor divide.
Comment: The rise of the knowledge economy and intangible assets as the basis for economic
growth. As knowledge is increasingly seen as a strategic resource, the impacts on regional productivity
and profitability tend to be high, considering the importance of labor-intensive, resource-intensive and
commodity-based economic activities in the region. As automation might replace completely the bundle
of tasks constituting a job, productivity will increase, but the expropriation from specific skills poses
new challenges for education systems and support institutions in terms of specialization and retraining.
The increasing interactions between workers and cyber-physical systems imply a complementarity in
human-machine relations, but the roles of each may vary widely. In one scenario, smart machines
would not be more than tools that support human decision-making, which ensure a dominant role for
highly qualified workers over machines. In such cases, the demand for knowledge workers will affect
national and regional strategies for human resources and economic specialization, given the need
for new competences and higher qualifications. It is clear that market frictions between supply and
demand for high-skilled employees are already occurring in more developed countries, particularly in
the ICT sector [119]. Also, as traditional manufacturing loses its importance in the process of economic
development, less-developed regions will be unable to follow that path. Rodrik [120] argues that
“countries are running out of industrialization opportunities sooner and at much lower levels of income
compared to the experience of early industrializers.” While the prospects for productivity growth are
enhanced, increasing inequality should be a concern.
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Proposition A15. Big Data and digital property rights.
Comment: The dematerialization of wealth production associated with technologies such as IoT,
big data and cloud computing raises questions about intellectual property rights, in addition to privacy,
security, and ethical concerns. For example, the Big Data Research and Development Initiative that
has been implemented in the US since 2012 suggests that new policy solutions may be necessary to
protect privacy, to clarify data ownership, and to secure data in the highly distributed networks that
are becoming increasingly common in big data application scenarios. Considering the important role
of public sector institutions in generating research and technological development, the ownership
of intangible/dematerialized resources is still undetermined, and consequently the appropriation of
their economic value. For instance, the digital transition and big data are spurring demand for data
specialists and skills for data analysis that exceeds both the current supply and the current capacity of
the education and training systems. Big data also brings new security concerns related to the ability of
government institutions to address cybersecurity problems, as well as corruption, which could lead to
big data breaches and the potential misuse of data. As individual interactions with all kinds of public
and private organizations are increasingly subjected to large scale surveillance, privacy has become a
merchandise, and the undesired effects of big data tend to be unequally distributed. As Jerome [121]
points out, discrimination, profiling, tracking and exclusion “threaten the self-determination and
personal autonomy of the poor more than any other class.”
Proposition A16. Digital readiness.
Comment: The concept of “digital readiness” applies not only to industries, but to the labor force
as well. Even though access to information has become almost universal, the supply of professional
education and labor qualification in the region has not been restructured to provide effective qualifications
so that workers are prepared for the impacts of the digital transition in the labor market. This is not
limited to well-defined areas such as computer science or engineering, but also to the need for the
development of transdisciplinary capabilities.
Proposition A17. Digitally disrupted economies.
Comment: The “sharing economy” and “platform economy” associated with cyber-physical
systems and mobile technologies disrupt traditional manufacturing and services in a growing number
of sectors. This creates opportunities for new business models and wealth creation but raises concerns
about regulatory issues and the creation of monopolies/oligopolies. Another unanticipated side effect
could be further inequality in the labor market: the power balance has shifted in favor of workers with
digital skills, especially when they are employed in sectors where digital skills are in high demand,
while a significant part of workers will be stuck with low capabilities and low value-added “gigs”.
As Katz [122] points out, “once the infrastructure gap has been addressed, human capital becomes the
stumbling block”. It should also be noted that the on-demand economy is not a main source of income
for most people, and this type of work is often underreported on labor surveys. Currently, on-demand
platforms do not provide sufficient work to generate income similar to that earned in traditional jobs.
However, if it continues to grow at the current pace, it will ultimately fundamentally change the
overall economy, not only sub-segments as it does today [123]. The fragile welfare institutions in the
region will be hard pressed to respond to the shift in the balance of power between employers and
gig workers, under increasingly virtual working relationships. Although discussions in this domain
tend to focus on work conditions and remuneration, the actors in the on-demand economy typically
lack representation or self-organization, and collective bargaining is largely absent. Since they are
not formally employed, they also lack social benefits such as minimum wages, sickness and holiday
pay, retirement benefits, and access to training opportunities. The potential dismantlement of the
current employment model also implies undesired effects on the political system. Employment benefits,
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healthcare, and social welfare systems rely mostly on salary-based taxes that account for a substantial
share of public resources and budgetary sustainability [124].
Proposition A18. Changing the agricultural supply chain. (Digital agriculture).
Comment: The growing insertion of new technologies in the agricultural value chain open
new opportunities for increased rural productivity but raises concerns about the reduced role of
local farmers in the supply chain, as well as with genetic diversity and sustainability of small farms.
This has been addressed in the region for some years (as in the case of transgenic crops, and specially
“Monsanto’s Roundup Ready” case), but policies to mitigate the unintended side effects are still unclear.
New technologies are also related to the labor force shift that is already affecting emerging economies
through the “premature deindustrialization” effect [120]. Even at the lower wage levels that prevail
in the sector, increased insertion of new technologies in agricultural production chains is becoming
cost-effective and capital-labor substitution is going to occur not only in manufacturing, but also
in agriculture.
Appendix A.6. Propositions on Industrial Change: Pablo Collazzo-Yelpo
Proposition A19. Digital Competitiveness: meaning and performance across South American economies
(digital competitiveness).
Comment: Readiness to exploit digital transformations begs for a coalition of ‘doers’ and ‘shapers’,
as South American firms (the ‘doers’) need to build up digital capabilities to increase competitiveness,
while policy makers (the ‘shapers’) should upgrade the overall context that enables the development
of digital technologies –an open, agile regulatory and technological framework.
Proposition A20. Industry 4.0 and the need to reconcile the digital world with the physical world—The South
American case (Industry 4.0 divide).
Comment: Advanced production techniques leveraging smart technologies create the enterprise,
interconnected, data-driven, yet one that should plug back in the physical world to deliver more
efficient decision-making and higher productivity. Industry 4.0 is beyond manufacturing, as digital
technologies are transforming not just production, but organizations altogether. It is not whether
robotics, analytics or the Internet of Things are to redesign operations but how to go about, at firm level,
selecting the digital tools that allow people to be more efficient and enhance output value. Digital
transitioning should arguably be firm-specific, as companies combine different resources, start off the
journey from different points of departure and seek a unique competitive advantage out of developing
digital capabilities. The single most important change that Industry 4.0 is likely to unleash is real-time
access to data, allowing information to spread faster, albeit not always accurately, and prompting firms
to be sharper, more responsive and flexible in their decision-making process. However, South America
is far from a level playing field—rather a land of asymmetries. And the gap between the digital-ready
and the digital-lagger is remarkable. As the divide is likely to lead to a zero-sum game, for the
benefit of the former at the expense of the latter, the question remains whether the typically bigger,
more resourceful firms may have an incentive to perpetuate their digital advantage—for instance
attempting to reduce knowledge and technology spill-overs across supply chains. Additionally, market
imperfections may prevent laggers from catching up, a systemic liability addressed in the following
Proposition (21).
Proposition A21. Firms across regions operate in diverse business environments, and South America offers
a bittersweet mix of enablers and barriers as companies transition to a digital environment.
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Comment: The expected productivity gains resulting from digital transformation require a steady
upgrade of the business environment across the region -increased firm-level productivity is contingent
on a better Diamond, in the sense of Porter [125]. In order for Industry 4.0 to fully unlock the productivity
gains resulting from an increasingly digitalized marketplace, the business environment in which firms
compete in the region arguably needs significant upgrades. Location plays a central role in shaping
firm-level productivity, and the diverse, asymmetric context in which firms operate across South America,
results in remarkably uneven starting points in the regional digital race, in very different national and
industry Diamonds [125]. The underlying rationale of the Diamond model (ibid.) lies in the claim
that natural endowments are unlikely to explain a region’s competitive advantage, but it is rather the
local capacity to innovate and upgrade its business environment and as a result unleash firm-level
productivity what accounts for its relative competitiveness. And when it comes to digital competitiveness,
a potential unseen would lie in the widening gap likely to be experienced by firms across different
Diamonds in the region, with a very different set of factor conditions -notably education and digital
infrastructure-, as well as equally dissimilar regulatory frameworks, which typically set the pace of
digital transformation.
Appendix A.7. Propositions on Big Data in Occupational Health: Frida Marina Fischer, João Silvestre
Silva-Junior, Maria Carmen Martinez, Rodolfo Andrade de Gouveia Vilela, Luis Fabiano de Assis, Maria
Regina Alves Cardoso
Information about OSWH: The Digital Observatory on Health and Safety at Work (OHSW)
(http://observatoriosst.mpt.mp.br) is a tool for knowledge management and the promotion of Decent
Work, aimed at informing citizens, workers, employers and public an overview of the occurrence of
occupational diseases and accidents in Brazil. It is the largest, most affordable, and most detailed
big data containing consolidated information on the subject in the country. Thus, it is an important
mechanism to subsidize the development, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies at the national,
state, regional and municipal levels. The observatory facilitates access to data that previously was
scattered in government databases or general yearbooks (from the Ministry of Planning, Development
and Management, Ministry of Labour, Social Security Secretary), which made it difficult to research
the subject and its understanding. The tool is maintained by the SMARTLAB for Decent Work
(https://smartlab.mpt.mp.br). The observatory was built in accordance with the best international
practices for the promotion of public policies, highlighting three main axes: 1. Promotion of transparency
and accountability through the organization and availability of data and information of public interest
for public access in general, with progressive adherence to the open data standard; 2. Development
and availability of tools for diagnosis, planning, management, monitoring, and evaluation for different
social actors involved in promoting decent work, based on results-oriented management principles;
3. Expansion of the knowledge on issues related to the world of work—considering its intersection
with the human rights agenda [126]. There are approximately five million companies in Brazil that
contribute to the social security system. This number corresponds to around 54 million formal jobs [127].
Based on the information provided by the OHSW, between 2012 and mid-2018 there were, on average,
per year: 653,000 work injuries, 2400 work fatalities; 51,300,000 lost workdays; approximately 1.1 billion
US$ of expenses due to social security benefits.
Proposition A22. Disclosure of work-related diseases and work injuries.
Comment: Public access to data on the notification of work-related diseases and work injuries
as well as social security benefits can support the discussion of priority actions to improve safety and
health at work. The OHSW already provides number of injuries’ notifications, social security expenditures,
lost workdays, fatal injuries, geographic location, branches of activity, and profile of the workers. New data
will be gradually made available, such as: even more detailed econometric estimates of the impact
of work injuries and work-related diseases on the economy, on productive activity, and on human
development; incidence rates, mortality and lethality by specific causes, as well as economic activity and
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demographic data among others. There is a possibility in the future of downloading microdata of interest
to users, ensuring, as provided by national legislation, the safeguarding of confidential data of individuals.
As a consequence, there may be a change in the management of public and private enterprises in order to
improve health promotion programs and prevention of work-related diseases/injuries. On the other hand,
the potential increase in the inspection and the economic impact of the increase in the rate of insurance
of work-related diseases/injuries may encourage the underreporting of events. By not having reliable
estimates of work-related illnesses and work injuries, attention is focused only on some job clusters ignoring
others that may also pose risks to workers’ health. This might lead to the maintenance of current high
numbers of negative health outcomes, including work injuries, or even to worsen working conditions.
Proposition A23. Digital data analytics and early functional aging.
Comment: Information on work-related injuries at the national level that negatively impact
workers’ ability can contribute objectively to the prevention of exclusion of workers associated with
early functional aging. However, underreporting of events can affect estimates of early functional
aging not favouring epidemiological surveillance of workplace risk factors. Additionally, data from
the Ministry of Health could provide detailed information on life-course exposure. The conditions and
organization of work are variables that influence the health status and work ability [128]. Therefore,
information on work conditions can help directing actions to promote and protect workers’ health.
The identification of stressors at work helps to adopt general and specific measures, which aim at the
prevention of injuries and work-related diseases. One of the positive effects is the maintenance of work
ability and the consequent extension of productive working life. Keeping people at work with greater
experience, who are generally older, can favour the adoption of beneficial strategies and productive
processes, given the greater ability of those workers to solve complex problems, to take appropriate
decisions, to convey effective communication and leadership skills [129]. However, unintended side
effects could be: (a) Keeping workers on the job for a longer number of years may reduce opportunities
for young workers to enter the workforce; (b) Job discrimination on employment decisions, selective
private health insurance policies such as fixing individual fees according to health status or even
rejection of health coverage. A recent labour reform [130] allows temporary and/or intermittent hiring
and may favour the offer of poor jobs, with limited social benefits.
Proposition A24. Payment of social security benefits and public policies.
Comment: Data on the amount of expenses with payments of social security benefits due to work
disability (work-related injuries/diseases) contribute to the discussion on the balance of the public accounts
of the Brazilian social security system. The diagnosis of the deficit between the financial contributions
to the system and the expenses corroborates understanding future social security changes. This aims
to achieve a balance between the costs and the incoming revenues. In Brazil, there is already a draft of
a constitutional amendment that proposes the reduction of workers’ access to social rights provided
by the current social security system [131]. Information on the economic burdens of work-related
injuries/diseases can also be used to subsidize changes in the employer’s tax system, taking into account
the health and safety risks for workers, with negative impacts on workability. Such changes in legislation
can promote social exclusion through an increase in the rigor of health assessments for work admission
as well as reduction of protection provided by the social security system in cases of work disability
due to work injuries/diseases. Financial trends, political and ideologies are important aspects challenging
the misuse of information by inappropriate recording and/or manipulation of data and events by
underreporting or falsifying or poor quality of information or by typos, data programming or analytical
errors. In order to achieve a better integration of big data analytics the Brazilian federal government
is implementing a new system that digitally integrates labor, social security, and tax information
compulsorily filed by all employers (eSocial) [132].
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Appendix A.8. Propositions on Digital Democracy: Diego Cardona and Aurora Sánchez
Proposition A25. The Myth of Connectivity.
Comment: Although connectivity as a government policy to promote the digital society has been
a hope for governments in Latin America, the reality is that, despite the significant investments made,
the impact has not been as expected. Connectivity understood as access to effective and efficient
communication systems, in particular to the Internet given the access to the information as a source of
power, evolves faster than the investment capacity to update the technological equipment required and
in those terms can be wrongly concluded the impossibility to maintain the community at the desired
digital society, however it is important to understand that what is important for communities, rather
than access to information, is to make intelligent use of it to provide efficient services. An interesting
example of this type of approach is the MuNet project, led by the Organization of American States
in various Latin American countries. Among others, the Patzun case at Guatemala presents a “best
practice” balancing needs and available resources, which also takes into account not only technological
factors, such as connectivity or access devices, but also social, cultural, and political factors that
may become more important for the success of any e-government initiative. As a result, appropriate
connectivity should increase the visibility of public matters, the trust in public administration and
improve the public administration control. Furthermore, connectivity should facilitate citizen access to
public information, procedures and services and obtain the citizens’ feedback in the decisions making
process, working in order to obtain effectiveness and efficiency at the offered services to optimize the
governmental investment in ICT. As a conclusion, the interest of governments should be providing
connectivity with appropriate technology to meet emerging needs instead providing it with the latest
technology [133,134].
Proposition A26. Redefining truth in democracy: Partial and post truth may influence positively or negatively
democratic processes.
Comment: The World Wide Web has created local and global awareness allowing citizens to receive
information about their local community, state, country and the whole world. In this context, social
media is a key platform that has redefined the role of citizens from simple consumers of media to content
producers and users simultaneously. This digital revolution has provoked important changes in what
is known as a democracy not only influencing the way people interact with each other and with their
communities but also offering a unique opportunity to pursue their goals. Now, new communities have
emerged with a more comprehensive perception of the world and with the power to mobilize people
to pursue changes that could benefit the whole society. The impact of this digital transformation on
democracy could be enormous in areas like the development of democratic processes and information
security. Platforms like twitter or Facebook may inadvertently turn elections, change decisions like Brexit
or change power structures, and the processes of gathering, producing, and disseminating news may
produce fake news, junk science, computational propaganda or aggressive micro-targeting. The changes
that digital media is introducing are not merely Twitter or Facebook ‘revolutions’, like the Arab Spring
or “los indignados” in Spain, but rather real changes in socio-technical configurations and cultural
contexts that may affect the truth and trust in democratic societies [135]. Therefore, the challenge is
moving the attention from the performance of those systems to the development of a new democratic
system that need to deal with populism, political polarization, far-right extremism, radicalization, waves
of hate against women and minorities, post-truth world, fake democracy and ultimately, the death of
democracy [45].
Proposition A27. Ambiguities with social media, global awareness and local actions.
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Comment: Social media is increasing global awareness and generating local actions in real time
on issues that may affect various communities around the world. This technology has become critical
to promote social attention and engagement in social and political activities. The level of awareness
about a social or political issue may be associated with the use of internet and social media as it was
recognized by Huang and Hong [136] in the case of Asia. This phenomenon is generating what we
can call a new type of civic activism where any user may impulse a social movement anytime from
anywhere and if the movement represents a community it will reach people’s attention. There are
many examples of social movements using social media, and they have grown exponentially through
the internet. Jost, Barberá, Bonneau, Langer, Metzger, Nagler, Sterling, and Tucker [137] analyzed the
latest social movement, as the #metoo, finding that social media platforms were crucial to exchange
information, coordinate activities, and exchange emotional information in support or opposition to
protest activities. Then, the evolution of communities from being traditionally physical to exist in the
digital world, with no ties to a particular location, is generating a new type of political engagement
which may impulse changes that were not planned. These new forms of civic activism may jeopardize
traditional structures and the whole social system. For example, in Chile, during 2018, most universities
saw a strike for women rights, and this movement is changing the whole power structure of those
universities. Then, the danger of installing global issues with pressing attention through digital
platforms is the lack of understanding about the needs, priorities, and level of preparedness of local
communities and the interplay between the needs of local and digital communities.
Proposition A28. Reduction of information asymmetry.
Comment: Digital technology is enabling knowledge sharing at a fast pace reducing information
asymmetry among individuals, communities, countries, and society. This technology that allows people
to know the development of the whole world is creating higher expectations in all actors in society and
generating a big gap between what it is known and wanted by people and the structures, actions, and
services that those countries, communities, and governments can provide. The reduction of information
asymmetry is happening in many spheres of society and is distorting the equilibrium of many systems in
it. The access to information that was previously unavailable or denied to people allows them to become
more efficient and make better and informed decisions. However, the acquisition of this knowledge
could generate new demands, on both the government and companies, and the countries may not be
structurally prepared to fulfill them. This pervasive effect can change the structure of society at all levels
since and it is changing the way people think, interact, and act [138]. It is particularly interesting to see the
changes in the financial systems, starting from crowdsourcing to the use of cryptocurrencies, the tourism
sector with the online reviews and booking services, the education system moving increasingly online,
and others. The consequences of this information asymmetry reduction may affect democracy as a whole
when it is used by populist leaders to create chaos and take advantage of the situation, to generate
commercial wars associated with the loss of privileges previously guaranteed or to keep the status
quo [139]. This latter scenario may create protectionisms, destroy democratic systems, create inefficiency
in the management of government resources, and redefine the way companies compete.
Proposition A29. The Increasing Digital Inequality.
Comment: The promise of the implementation of electronic government in its beginnings was the
democratization of the benefits of the digital society increasing efficiency and transparency, however,
in several cases it has been observed that despite efforts for integral improvements in connectivity, access
to technological tools and digital training, the real effect in Latin America has been contrary to what was
expected, instead of advancing towards the equity of the benefits of the digital society, it has actually
generated an increasing inequality. Evaluations such as the Electronic Government Index of the United
Nations or the Networked Readiness Index of the World Economic Forum show erratic behavior at the
regional level. For example, in human capital, an inertial trend is observed, the presence at the Web of the
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Government seems to improve, however, the technological infrastructure does not allow for an effective
reduction of the digital divide. On the other hand, the factors of public and macroeconomic policies for
the use of ICT to improve the economic growth are conditioned by a turbulent environment that does not
allow its optimal deployment. Likewise, the evidence on the impact of electronic government strategies
on the corruption perception index of Transparency International or the GINI Index of the World Bank are
not unanimous. While the region seems to have a positive behavior in the electronic government index
and in the networked readiness index, no improvements are observed in the corruption perceptions index
nor in the GINI Index. As a conclusion, despite a possible advance in the regulations and in the indexes
of international evaluation of elements related to electronic government, its updating and improvement
process is still under construction [140].
Appendix A.9. Propositions on Cybercrime: Rodrigo Sánchez Rios
It is known that the emergence of new technologies affected society in many ways, not only
shortening distances and simplifying daily tasks, but also making peoples life busier and exposing
them to more risks. Consequently, these advances made new forms of criminality possible, such as
cybercrimes (an offense that specifically attacks software and hardware) and cyber-enabled crimes
(a traditional offense committed with the help of the internet). As a response to this phenomenon,
there are some propositions that deserve to be taken into consideration.
Proposition A30. What is considered crime oﬄine must also be considered crime online.
Comment: First of all, besides the discussion of what is cybercrime, it is necessary to have in mind
that the traditional offenses are still being committed, not in its usual form, but through the internet.
And that, by itself, is already a challenge that must be faced by all members of the criminal justice
system, regarding that the Law not always can predict every possible aspect of a crime. That being
said, the Courts are having difficulty fitting these cyber-enabled crimes into the already existing legal
dispositions. As an example, a fraud committed with the help of a social network must be punished in
the same way as a fraud committed in person. Nevertheless, when we talk about a virtual environment,
there are more obstacles from the prosecution point of view: the identity of the offender is not always
easily found or even from where the offender is operating.
Proposition A31. The international cooperation is fundamental to fight cybercrimes and cyber-enabled crimes.
Comment: This proposition is highly linked to the latter, because those are new forms of criminality
that do not occur in the classical way. These offenses are committed in a virtual environment and
can cause as much damage as the traditional kind, but they cannot be as easily detected. That is
why the cooperation between countries is so important in the investigation period and also in the
actual prosecution phase, in order to collect evidence, enforce warrants, and even arrest people.
The transnational nature of most of those crimes is one of the reasons that makes it so hard to fight
and prevent them from happening. Countries have to cooperate with each other, especially through
international agreements, so that all the information is obtained respecting both legal systems. In other
words, the existence of a mutual legal assistance treaty in criminal matter is key to avoid discussions
regarding the admissibility in court of the evidence obtained with the help of international cooperation.
Proposition A32. When the author commits a lesser included offense as means to commit another, both acts
must be merged.
Comment: It is already known that the criminal justice system does not work easily with the
new forms of criminality, mostly because there are aspects of those offenses that are not accessible to
the public. Understanding cybercrimes and its circumstances require a specific knowledge that is not
always available to the ones who work with the law (students, law enforcement agents, attorneys,
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prosecutors, judges, etc.). In this scenario, when there are two offenses and one is just a means to
achieve the second, we must apply the “merger” doctrine, which indicates that the person can only
be punished by the greater crime. That must also be observed in the cases involving cybercrime and
traditional criminality, because the actions perpetrated in the virtual environment are now an important
way to facilitate the activities of large criminal organizations, for example. Nowadays, several offenses
demand this interaction between the online and oﬄine world, such as: money laundering, human
trafficking, terrorism, etc. Therefore, the problems that come with the use of internet for committing
crimes must be analyzed through the perspective of only one conduct.
Appendix A.10. Propositions on Corruption: Edimara M. Luciano
Proposition A33. Outdated approach on processes analyses can increase segregated, fragmented, nonintegrated
processes, data and technologies as well as bureaucracy.
Comment: ICTs have been increasingly used in anti-corruption initiatives [141]. Sometimes these
efforts are more focused on technologies [142], instead of also focusing on organizational processes.
Focusing the discussion straight on technologies can be good to convince partners, to answer to media
pressures, and when it is difficult to deal with the pressure and influence of IT suppliers. Nevertheless,
technologies, as modern as they can be, need to better support the organizational processes [143].
Frequently, processes analysis is put aside because it is not trendy and does not bring much recognition.
Decision-making focused on technology more than on its suitability for the organizational processes
(even considering that they need to be previously reviewed and changed) can increase the presence of
segregated, fragmented, not integrated processes, data and technologies in governmental agencies.
Consequently, it can increase short-term costs by selecting inadequate or unnecessary complex
technologies, and long-term costs by increasing the number of ad-hoc solutions [144] and reducing the
solutions lifespan. However, there is a risk of increasing bureaucracy in case the focus on processes
retrogresses to the Business Process Reengineering (which in Brazil was also known as Organizations
& Methods instead of using a comprehensive and up-to-date processes approach connected with
a better support to public policies and governmental strategies, and to citizens and civil servants
necessities. It is crucial to develop state capacity on high-level discussion and decision-making related
to organizational processes.
Proposition A34. Initiatives focused on reducing bureaucracy can lead to under regulated situations.
Comment: Initiatives related to the reduction of the levels of bureaucracy are vital to reduce
the levels of corruption [145]. For example, bureaucracy hinders the establishing of companies [46].
This increases the vulnerabilities of public agents to corruption, more specifically bribery to speed
up the process [146]. The ease of doing business ranking [147] is way to understand the level of
bureaucracy in a country. When analyzing this ranking and the Corruption Perception Index [148]
together, it is possible to observe that the least corrupted countries are also the least bureaucratic ones.
The same occurs with countries at the bottom of both rankings: the more bureaucratic countries are
also the more corrupt ones. The reduction of bureaucracy involves efforts to reduce the number of
forms, documents, and steps citizens need to go through to use a governmental service, as well as the
paperwork civil servants need to do to perform their duties. Debureaucratization frequently aims at
lean administration [149]. In countries with high levels of state bureaucracy, laws, rules and procedures
are complex, numerous and sometimes disconnected or overlapped, increasing the occurrence of over
or under regulated situations [46]. Simultaneously, there are several initiatives focusing on increasing
the number of digital services and trying to take part of the digital transformation. Despite the good
intentions, it would be an unfortunate consequence if laws, rules, and procedures started to be changed
without the necessary discussion and without considering all the inherent complexity, and focused
only on giving fast answers to the civil society pressures. This situation can lead to under regulated
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situations, which can paradoxically increase corruption. It is necessary to develop state capacity on
decision-making and governance focusing on long-term planning decisions.
Proposition A35. Anti-corruption practices can present rebound effects when they are not suitable to a specific
context and are not chosen by proper collective decision processes supporting the governance process.
Comment: Corruption is often analysed as a legal, political or economic phenomenon. However,
sometimes practices that are successful in some contexts are adopted through mimetic processes in contexts
that do not share the same cultural or social beliefs. Considering that, the social-cultural-behavioral
dimension needs to be observed in order to avoid the creation of anti-corruption practices that are not
adequate in some contexts and, consequently, are difficult to legitimize and can generate rebound effects.
The cultural rules show what is socially allowed, and whether something is accepted or penalized
depends on culture, zeitgeist, sensitivities and social beliefs. The social approach considers that corruption
is linked to the way a society tolerates both corruption and corrupt agents and is linked to social beliefs
and socially accepted behaviors [150]. The attempt to understand whether cultural attributes can explain
the variation in the level of corruption is the focus of the cultural approach [151]. The behavioral
approach emphasizes the understanding that government practices are vulnerable to the practices of
individuals acting in favor of the interest of private groups, transforming their behavior into corrupt
behavior [152]. Corruption is a multidimensional issue and this fact requires that discussion and approval
of anti-corruption laws, policies, rules, and procedures have to be done by proper collective decision
processes supporting the governance process. Much attention has to be paid to how processes (e.g.,
public voting, multi-stakeholder forums, transdisciplinary processes) are carried out to avoid unrealistic
populist solutions (e.g., an over complex system which may be easily undermined), which do not
improve the current practices. It is critical to develop state capacity on transdisciplinary decision-making
and governance focusing long-term changes.
Proposition A36. Corruption reframes digital transformation.
Comment: Progressively, efforts dealing with corruption are having better results when using the
support of ICTs [153]. The opening data efforts on the increase of governmental transparency as a way
to generate accountability are valuable initiatives to make society aware of corruption and also to
allow social control. However, as important as it may be, it is not enough to deal with corruption. It is
necessary a complex combination of technical, legal, social, organizational and behavioral measures,
provided the same technology tools that are used to deal with corruption can be used to create new
vulnerabilities. The decentralization of information leads to diminishing corruption opportunities [154],
and digital transformation makes governmental policy systems smarter and more evidence-based.
Digitalization increases the ‘digital trail’, which in turn could lead to a higher chance of getting caught
in the act of performing corrupt practices [155]. ICTs increase the results monitoring and traceability
of government employees’ activities [156]. However, disclosed data, data from user digital trails or
ICTs for monitoring can be used as a starting point for frauds or bribes. Corruption works as a net.
If a node that was using cash payments as part of a corruption process is dismantled, something such
a Bitcoin-based (i.e., alternative currency-based) Darknet can be quickly established and a new node is
created. Ionescu [157] note that the majority of fraud and corruption is practiced through someone
inside the organization. Consequently, when governmental services are digitalized, the corruption
simply changes from an oﬄine to an online practice. It calls attention to the necessity of more secure
and automated systems, but also to the fact that corruption has been redefined by digital transformation
because of the new opportunities generated by technology to data and information misuse, frauds,
and resources misapplication and misappropriation.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 718 40 of 47
Appendix A.11. Propositions on Banking and Cryptocurrency: Eduardo Henrique Diniz
Proposition A37. Growth in adoption of complementary cryptocurrencies.
Comment: As a phenomenon known for decades and observed in different countries, complementary
currencies are generally regarded as private and mostly non-regulated tools for fighting social exclusion and
encouraging local development. While the emergency of the cryptocurrencies has become a particularly
important case in the field of digital payments in general, it is also becoming a relevant subject for
understanding the evolution of complementary currencies. Having reached a number of thousands of
projects in the last few years, complementary currencies have also been characterized by a counter cyclical
behavior, meaning that they tend to be adopted when economic crises arise and unemployment and a lack
of access to the mainstream financial systems close the doors to the more vulnerable part of the population,
reducing their level of adoption when the economic cycle rises up. This counter cyclical behavior can
be observed by investigating the Swiss complementary currency known as Wirtschaftsring (“Economic
Circle”), or simply WIR. Studies show that WIR, founded in 1934, is negatively correlated with GDP,
what can be explained by the way individuals that are cash-short in a recession go more often after the
use of WIR-credits. With the emergence of cryptocurrencies, the idea of dealing with alternative (and
complementary) currencies in parallel with the fiat currencies become less exotic and not only restricted to
the world of (systemic or eventual) underdeveloped economies. As technology behind cryptocurrencies
(blockchain) is being also adopted by a number of more traditional complementary currencies, it is possible
to expect that the use of complementary cryptocurrencies in the format of “neighborhood currencies”
or “social currencies” will grow. As an unseen, i.e., phenomenon which causes unintended side effects,
the emergence of cryptocurrencies, and its impact on the growth of complementary cryptocurrencies is
largely underestimated and should deserve more attention from social scientists and economists.
Proposition A38. Emergence of crypto-engagement, type of social and citizen engagement based on
cryptocurrencies adoption (Citizen crypto engagements).
Comment: The use of some type of monetary reward as a way to promote engagement (or fidelization)
of a client with a particular service or product provider is somehow well known for decades. Rebates
for buying in some stores, discounts in a second buy, milage programs, are all consolidated examples
of the so called fidelization that create lock-in between the client and the provider, and in most cases
are considered successful strategies, since both parts, buyer and seller, see advantages in adopting
them. Less common than using monetary reward to promote engagement with clients is the use of
monetary reward to promote engagement among citizens or with social causes, although some cases are
worthwhile to mention. The Portuguese “lixo” (literally “garbage”) is a parallel paper currency used in
a neighborhood in Lisbon to “pay” citizens that contribute with the garbage collection. Citizens can use
this payment in lixos to buy in the local commerce, that also see value in keeping the neighborhood clean,
and to pay for transport, a service controlled at the city level. Another example is the e-portemonnee
(e-wallet) designed to facilitate sustainable environmentally friendly behavior, rewarding participants for
positive actions such as switching to a green energy provider or delivering goods to the local secondhand
shop. E-portmonee credit is processed and stored in a central database where every user has his or her
own electronic credit account and can be used to pay for other sustainable services or products. Nota
Fiscal Paulista is another example from a state government in Brazil, whereby users that buy in a shop can
ask for a credit related to a small percentage of his or her expending, and retrieve this credit later when
paying for public services, such as some types of government taxes. All these initiatives could be better
explored if they were converted into some type of cryptocurrency, what would make them more valuable
for the users, that could be immediately available in their digital wallets and converted in benefits
for them through their e-wallets, and also good for the currency issuer (usually a local government)
that would have a better platform to control the issuance and circulation of these parallel currencies.
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Both sides, citizens and local governments, would benefit with a higher level of crypto-engagement.
This is another unseen phenomenon that would deserve a better attention of social scientists through
more in-depth research on these innovative ways to promote citizen engagement, or crypto-engagement.
Proposition A39. The challenge of expanding of stable cryptocurrencies that have prices tied to physical and/or
stable values.
Comment: While most cryptocurrencies, such as the case of Bitcoin, are well known by their
price volatility, stable cryptocurrencies are immune to the volatility of market-traded cryptocurrencies
by pegging their value to a regular fiat currency, such as the USD, or even to stable physical unity,
such as time or energy (kilowatt-hour). Although they are also built around the same technology
of other cryptocurrencies (blockchain), they avoid unnecessary market risk either by adjusting the
supply of the currency or by holding matching reserve assets in a fiat currency or other physical asset.
A number of stable cryptocurrencies are being designed to promote local, social, or environmental
development and are seen to be more acceptable for adoption by users, since most people feel more
comfortable living in a world where monetary value is more stable over time. Some examples of
this type of stable cryptocurrencies are: Liverpool Pound, Tel-Aviv Shekel, Plastic Bank, Faircoin,
Moeda, and MonedaPar. Although still outnumbered by the more traditional volatile cryptocurrencies,
stable cryptocurrencies could grow to become a more interesting model for those considering the
implementation of complementary currencies. While most researchers are struggling to understand
the market behavior of volatile currencies, the potential of stable cryptocurrencies remains mostly
unseen within the academic world.
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